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young people want to be the estab-
lishment-the sooner the better! 
CORRESPONDENCE If the altruism of this generation seems to have evaporated or is less 
evident today, perhaps we should 
look for the causes. The postwar 
generation has no choice but to be 
hard-working. They entered a de-
pressed job market in huge num-
bers: twice as many of today's 
workers are in the 24 to 35-year-
old age group as there were 15 
years ago. A little sympathy may be 
in order: most young families must 
have two incomes to achieve the 
good things that former genera-
tions of Americans expected as a 
matter of course (such as owning 
one's own home). Many young 
women today do not have the lux-
ury to let the babies come when 
they will, and then stay home and 
teach them to read, as we did. 
To the Editor of The Cresset: 
As a woman who lives and works 
with young Americans in their 20s 
and 30s, I find it surprising that 
Gail Eifrig swallowed the media 
hype on the "Yuppie generation" 
so completely ("The Yuppie 
Phenomenon," May, 1 985). She ad-
mits that she knows only "one or 
two of them," which isn't a very 
good sample on which to base one's 
opinion of an entire generation. If 
Ms. Eifrig would venture from her 
ivory tower and spend some time 
in the real world, she would find 
this group of people as diverse as 
any other generation. Roger Hick-
ey, a charter member of this 
group put his case succinctly in a 
recent article in the New York Times: 
I may be a young urban professional, 
but I'm no yuppie. In fact, very few of 
my contemporaries fit the "life style 
profile" that has been imposed on us 
in the past year or so. Only a very 
small percentage of us are stockbrok-
ers or MBAs; many more of us drive 
used Toyotas than new BMWs; and 
while a few may be making millions in 
new high-tech companies, most are liv-
ing from paycheck to paycheck and 
struggling to pay the rent. 
Only the very naive, or those into 
mass hype, would attempt to pin a 
label on a group of people ranging 
in age from 21 to 39-roughly one-
third of the population of the U.S. 
The driving force of self-interest 
that is "the fascination of the hor-
rendous" to Ms. Eifrig is the same 
force that has been apparent in 
every generation since Adam-in-
cluding that of Ms. Eifrig. For an 
insight into the old-hat quality of 
today's alleged Yuppie characteris-
tics, here is the description of an 
American businessman of the 50s, 
written by an incisive social ob-
server of that generation, John P. 
Marquand: 
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He is self-confident. He believes in 
being in shape and completes an exer-
cise program every morning. He be-
lieves appearances are important and 
pays careful attention to his clothes. 
He works very hard-twelve-hour days 
are common-because that is what it 
takes to get ahead. His real loyalty is to 
himself-and to the bottom line. He 
knows the value of things; brand 
names, wines, and antiques. He is a 
sophisticated consumer. Though he is 
in his early thirties, he is well on the 
way to running his own company. 
Ms. Eifrig's comparisons of her 
(and my) generation to that of the 
so-called Yuppies ("We were de-
voted to doing good within the sys-
tem . . . they went to demonstra-
tions and love-ins") are self-right-
eous and, moreover, inaccurate. 
They, too, were idealistic and 
worked to improve the system; 
their generation, more than ours, 
helped to launch the civil rights 
movement and to end the war in 
Viet Nam. If "Yuppies" voted for 
Ronald Reagan in overwhelming 
numbers in 1984, so did every 
other generation of Americans, in-
cluding Ms. Eifrig's. And far from 
being "devoted system-haters," 
many observers think that these 
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The less said about Ms. Eifrig's 
admitted jealousy of people who 
know how to have a good time, the 
better; but I do rather resent her 
characterization of my generation 
as a bunch of sourpusses who 
spend all their time recycling 
aluminum cans, who don't have 
any fun. And if her principles are 
so insecure that they "look tacky" 
in the light of other people's 
values, she is speaking for herself, 
but certainly not for all of us. 
Corinne Grotheer Ramming 
Darien, Connecticut 
When wild high cries of geese 
herald the death 
of green 
things she watches fixed 
immobile in her metal chair 
under the beating of dark wings 
her dress sunfaded 
paisley fingers stiff against disease 
Eve paling at the end of a sunset 
she smiles 
I'm afraid if I touch her 
her soul will depart like leaves. 
Ramona C. Cramer 
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IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
The United Nations at Forty 
This month marks the fortieth anniversary of the 
founding of the United Nations. Few Americans are 
more than vaguely aware of the anniversary, and even 
fewer think it a matter of any significance. The sad 
thing is that they have little reason to assume other-
Wise. 
It now requires a major effort at historical recon-
struction to recall the enormous enthusiasm that ac-
companied the UN's birth in 1945. Statesmen may 
have had their reservations, but to a considerable de-
gree they shared the hopes of ordinary citizens that 
the new agency would bring, if not the greening of the 
globe, at least unprecedented opportunities for inter-
national cooperation and general disarmament. The 
concept of collective security seemed not the illusion it 
now appears in retrospect but a realistic step toward 
world peace. There were critics and skeptics from the 
beginning-isolationists, always a significant force in 
American politics, thought the UN a dubious venture 
in internationalism-but they were greatly outnum-
bered by those weary of war and eager to seize on any 
hope for avoiding it in future. 
The Cold War brought a quick end to the idealistic 
hopes attending the UN's founding. What had been 
intended as a forum for international cooperation 
soon became a battleground in the East-West conflict. 
Most Americans managed to ignore that development 
as long as the UN remained generally sympathetic to 
U.S. interests. But when the organization's pro-West-
ern tilt disappeared in the 1 960s, Americans came in-
creasingly to understand that the UN was not so much 
an agency of internationalism as a showcase for the 
continuing competitiveness of the nation-state system. 
The emergence of Third World politics at the UN-a 
politics whose preoccupation with the heritage of col-
onialism gave it a distinct anti-Western bias-added to 
American suspicions that the world organization was 
turning into a most unfriendly place. 
By now, skepticism toward the UN has become a 
political staple. Supporters of the organization-a 
dwindling breed-find themselves on the defensive, 
and their arguments for continued American partici-
pation normally display more in the way of resigned 
acceptance than enthusiastic endorsement. No one 
takes too seriously the far Right's perpetual plea to get 
the U.S. out of the UN (and vice versa), but neither 
does anyone indulge any more in the "last, best hope 
of humanity" rhetoric that was once so common in dis-
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course concerning the agency. 
Much of the prevailing cynicism is justified. Political 
activity inevitably manifests a discrepancy between the 
moralistic language that surrounds it and the actual 
behavior it involves, but at the UN the gap between 
rhetoric and reality is so profound that, as the saying 
goes, it gives hypocrisy a bad name. Nowhere else does 
one hear more concerning peace, justice, and human 
rights, and nowhere else are those terms subject to so 
much selective application or so much bad faith. The 
shortcomings-real and imagined--of certain pro-
Western nations such as Israel, Chile, and South Af-
rica receive unrelieved attention, while the equivalent 
deficiencies of all sorts of squalid tyrannies on the Left 
go unremarked. 
The awareness of most Americans of these absurd 
double standards is indicated by the indifference with 
which they respond to the UN's political judgments. 
Only on certain egregious occasions-as in the resolu-
tions equating Zionism with racism-do the UN's ten-
dentious predilections receive notice. Most of the time, 
the organization's inconsequence is exemplified by the 
absence of notice its irresponsibility arouses. 
In recent years, the United States has begun to treat 
the UN with greater seriousness, even as it has more 
openly than usual denigrated its overall significance. 
Under former ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. 
began to respond vigorously to attacks on it within the 
UN and to put Third World (and other) nations on 
notice that they could no longer oppose America with 
impunity or vote regularly against its interests without 
those votes affecting bilateral relations. Consistent anti-
American behavior would not go unnoticed or un-
punished. (America's withdrawal from UNESCO, 
based mainly on that agency's descent into ideological 
politics, stemmed from the same impulses.) 
Critics found such attitudes unnecessarily harsh and 
vindictive. A great power, they suggested, should mag-
nanimously understand and ignore the attacks, how-
ever unjustified, of emerging nations whose insecurity 
and fragile identity commonly find expression in for-
mulaic attacks on the "neo-colonialist" West. There is 
a point to that criticism. But there is also a point to 
the Reagan Administration's rejoinder that we treat 
Third World nations with greater respect and dignity 
by taking their actions seriously-and acting accord-
ingly-than by indulging them as adolescent societies 
whose insignificance for us we demonstrate by dismiss-
ing their behavior as beneath serious notice. That kind 
of indulgence, after all, expresses its own form of 
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contempt. 
A related issue involves the effects of the Adminis-
tration's newly-aggressive policies on general public 
opinion toward the UN. Critics argue that those 
policies recklessly inflame anti-UN attitudes and thus 
further weaken the reputation and effectiveness of an 
organization already damaged by its low standing with 
the American public. Yet it may be that the Adminis-
tration's policies, whatever their intended effects, act 
less to exacerbate criticism of the UN than to disarm 
it. Americans may not succumb so readily to argu-
ments that the UN threatens American interests if 
they see their government acting vigorously within the 
organization to reward its friends and punish its 
enemies. A policy in which America is seen actively to 
protect its interests within the UN probably does more 
good for the organization's standing in public opinion 
than one which, by imposing Olympian self-restraint 
on American officials, gives the appearance of ineffec-
tuality in furthering national ends. 
A new realism towards the UN need not degenerate 
into total cynicism. For all its faults, it still serves a 
number of useful purposes. If too much of the talk 
there is cheap, it does still serve as .a place where na-
tions whose interests have come into conflict can con-
veniently continue to talk rather than resort to bellige-
rent action. And in situations where the great powers 
do not see their own interests directly threatened and 
are therefore willing to grant the organization free-
dom of action, the UN has frequently served as an 
arena for reconciliation and as an active keeper of the 
peace. Most people, finally, recognize the invaluable 
role the UN has played in refugee work, in public 
health and economic development, and in a whole 
host of humanitarian and social endeavors. If the UN 
were to be destroyed, in short, we would feel ourselves 
required to reconstruct something very much like it. 
If we are to view the UN without illusions, we shall 
have to resist imposing on it expectations it cannot be 
expected to fulfill . It is in exorbitant expectations that 
cynicism most readily breeds. Durable political support 
for the UN will have to be based on a clearer under-
standing than we have previously managed of what it 
can reasonably be expected to accomplish. 
We might begin by recognizing that the lofty inter-
nationalist norms by which we have judged the UN 
make little sense in a world where nationalism reigns 
supreme and the nation-state system can be expected 
to prevail into the foreseeable future. Those who insist 
that we must learn to think of ourselves primarily as 
citizens of the world and fellow passengers on 
spaceship earth fa~e insuperable political and emo-
tional obstacles in achieving their ends. We lack the 
imaginative resources to transcend the national/patriot-
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ic attachments that help form our social identities, 
and, more importantly, we have not the vaguest idea 
how we might construct an international political 
order of real substance that would not immediately be-
come an intolerable tyranny. 
That is not to say, of course, that the nations of the 
world cannot cooperate for certain common ends. 
There are global problems with which we are all famil-
iar that will require common attention and action, and 
there the UN can continue to play a useful, if limited, 
role. A wise sense of the national interest will include 
considerable space for international cooperation. But 
that is a quite different thing from the dream of fun-
damental transcendence of nationalism that lay behind 
the more extravagant hopes of the UN's founders and 
that continues to serve as the basis of the inter-
nationalist perspective. Wendell Willkie's vision of One 
World may have imaginative value in reminding us of 
the limits and dangers of nationalism, but taken liter-
ally it remains a utopian illusion . 
The abiding problem is power. All political orders 
involve the use of power, and if there is one thing that 
political modernity has taught us it is that the premier 
danger of politics is the danger of concentrated power. 
The conundrum of internationalism thus becomes ob-
vious: in an age where we fear that national power has 
grown beyond our capacity to control , how can we 
even begin to contemplate the dangers inherent in the 
creation of effective transnational power? For Ameri-
cans, the specter of such power becomes all the more 
fearful when we recognize that under current condi-
tions any likely international order would fall under 
the control of ideological forces indifferent or even 
antipathetic to the political values we most cherish. 
The UN, then, must continue to operate in restric-
tive circumstances. It upholds an internationalist 
beacon in a nationalist world, and that beacon serves 
both as an incentive to rouse us from our parochialism 
and as a temptation to consolidated power that we 
need sedulously to resist. At a less grandiose level of 
analysis, friends of the UN will have to recognize that 
the U.S. (or any other nation) cannot reasonably be 
expected to check its national interest at the organiza-
tion's door, and that the UN will consequently remain 
as much an arena of national conflict as a source of 
international comity. We can struggle for a relatively 
more just and peaceful international order, but we ex-
pect more than that at our moral and political peril. 
Reinhold Niebuhr instructed us long ago that the 
path of decent politics follows the narrow road be-
tween cynicism and sentimentality. If we apply that 
wisdom unblinkingly to the United Nations, the less 
embittered we might become over its large failures , 
the more grateful for its small triumphs. Cl 
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Gilbert Meilaender 
C. S. LEWIS RECONSIDERED 
Can Christian Apology Withstand Rational Appraisal? 
In the rite of baptism the sign of the cross is placed 
"upon the forehead and the breast" of the baptized 
one. That is to say, both the mind and the heart are 
claimed by and offered to the God who has revealed 
himself as the Crucified One. But the task of offering 
mind and heart to God-and offering them in con-
cert-is lifelong. Perhaps some day reason and imagi-
nation, intellect and passion, will be reconciled, but 
even in the experience of believers the cleavage be-
tween them is often deep and some conflict inevitable. 
Few Christian writers in this century have managed 
to speak as effectively to both mind and heart as did 
C. S. Lewis. Some readers have been attrac~ed by the 
persuasive force of the reasoned argument he pro-
vides; others have been drawn in through his 
metaphors, analogies, and stories, and have had their 
imaginations baptized by his writings even as he said 
his had been by the books of George MacDonald . In 
C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, a book 
published recently this year by Eerdmans, John Be-
versluis examines Lewis' arguments in behalf of reli-
gious belief and finds them sorely wanting. On Be-
versluis' reading, Lewis displayed toward the end of 
his life a "divided mentality, a mentality at odds with 
itself'-no longer able to find persuasive arguments 
for what he still desperately wanted to believe. 
It must be said at the outset that Beversluis' book is 
not very good; indeed, one wonders whether 
Eerdmans, having been identified for so long with 
books largely favorable toward Lewis, is doing any-
Gilbert Meilaender is Associate Professor and Chairman of 
the Department of Religion at Oberlin College. His most re-
cent book is The Theory and Practice of Virtue (Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press, 1984). He is also the author of 
The Taste for the Other: The Social and Ethical 
Thought of C. S. Lewis (Eerdmans, 1978). He is a fre-
quent contributor to The Cresset. 
6 
thing more than seeking the respectability that comes 
from showing that it too can be critical. Still, Be-
versluis does focus on some of Lewis' central argu-
ments, and we can use his book to reconsider Lewis' 
case for Christianity. First, though, at least a few of 
the book's defects call for notice. 
One of the problems with Beversluis' work is that he 
pays little attention to Lewis' imaginative writings and, 
in particular, to a book like Till We Have Faces-this 
despite the fact that he has surely read them and must 
know them well. Beversluis says that he will focus · on 
Lewis' apologetic writings. But with Lewis the imagina-
tive works are part of the apology, and to ignore them 
is to skew one's reading considerably. The author who, 
recounting his own conversion, could focus on the 
baptism of his imagination through reading a fantasy, 
who could claim (only partly with tongue in cheek) 
that anyone who did not wish to become a believer 
had better be careful what authors he read , who at the 
conclusion of one of his own fantasies could suggest 
that what moderns need is not new beliefs but new im-
ages, who could forthrightly state that in writing his 
children's stories he was (among other things) trying to 
steal past the "watchful dragons" that keep us from 
believing-such an author's "apology" for Christianity 
cannot be found only in books with titles like · Miracles 
or The Problem of Pain. 
Lewis once wrote that while reason was the organ of 
truth, imagination w·as the organ of meaning. And 
since Beversluis is interested not only in the truth but 
also in the meaningfulness of religion (we are treated 
by him to a short discussion of the verification/falsifi-
cation debate in twentieth-century philosophy), he can-
not capture the full force of Lewis' views apart from 
the imaginative writings. 
Beversluis writes, he tells us, to rescue Lewis from 
the "excessive hostility" of his fierce critics but also 
from the "excessive loyalty" of his uncritical admirers. 
Not that Lewis' admirers are entirely to be blamed; his 
crisp, no-nonsense prose has perhaps seduced them. 
Still more, they Jack the training and sophistication 
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needed to see through Lewis' glibness. "The people to 
whom he primarily addresses himself are not trained 
in philosophy; they are on the whole simply not in a 
position to recognize his distortions, omissions, and 
oversimplifications." Good to have Beversluis around 
to help! This despite the evidence that can be found 
in Beversluis' own citations to show that most of the 
arguments Lewis put forward in his books aimed at 
"popular" audiences can also be found in essays deliv-
ered at places like the Socratic Club in Oxford, where 
the famous exchange between Lewis and the 
philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe about Lewis' refuta-
tion of naturalism took place. 
John Beversluis is in no position to 
damn Lewis for oversimplifying; one 
senses in his theological excursions 
the remains of some Calvinistic 
Sunday School lessons imperfectly 
nuanced. Still, even a bad book may 
treat important issues, and this does. 
Beversluis tells us that Lewis often wrote irresponsi-
bly, not taking the pains necessary to understand the 
views he was rejecting. This is a strange criticism from 
an author who himself has a disconcerting tendency to 
tell his readers in no uncertain terms what a biblical 
or orthodox view is. He tells us-discussing Lewis' 
"lord-or-lunatic" dilemma-that the Jews of Jesus' day 
may have regarded him as a blasphemer but certainly 
not a madman. Perhaps he should consideer Mark 
3:21. For Beversluis the view (not just of Lewis but of, 
say, Augustine and Dante) that God is the One whom 
all truly desire has "not a shred of evidence in the 
Bible" to support it. Perhaps he should become ac-
quainted with the Gospel of John. He writes , citing I 
Corinthians l:2lff., that Christianity and hellenistic 
philosophy are irreconcilably opposed; yet, we might 
wonder whether the Logos of John's Gospel can be en-
tirely alien to "his own" creation to which he came. 
An author who holds that "in the Bible" human be-
ings and God do not share "a common moral world" 
and that to be a Christian one must simply "bow the 
head and bend the knee" but never raise a question 
needs to be asked once again what St. John means in 
saying that the Logos came to "his own," what the sig-
nificance of incarnation is. Beversluis is in no position 
to damn Lewis for oversimplifying; one senses in his 
theological excursions the remains of some Calvinistic 
Sunday School lessons imperfectly nuanced. These :re-
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mains could lead to a rejection of God-or as easily to 
some form of "revelation positivism." 
Beversluis tells the reader that among Lewis' most 
serious weaknesses as an apologist was "his fondness 
for the false dilemma." Yet his own book fairly bristles 
with one dilemma after another which supposedly con-
fronts Lewis. He is surprised that Lewis should de-
scribe God both as the One for whom our hearts long 
and as One from whom we shrink. In thus describing 
our relation to God Lewis may or may not be correct, 
but he is simply reworking a common Christian under-
standing of what it means to be both a creature made 
by and for God and a fallen creature living a lie by 
seeking to be independent of God. To need and long 
for God while in pride denying our neediness is a re-
latively common description of the state of the sinful 
creature, at least in the Augustinian strand of Chris-
tian thought. On this view our sinfulness is displayed 
precisely in the fact that we are thus torn and divided 
and cannot love God with a whole heart. To be sure, 
there are difficult issues here, and much of the litera-
ture about the relation of agape and eros probes these 
issues both historically and philosophically. But Be-
versluis, in the grip of an understanding of sin which 
imagines that depravity could not possibly leave any 
place for desire for God, can find here only a di-
lemma: "Either God is the ultimate Object of desire or 
he is not. If he is, then it makes no sense to talk about 
shrinking from him the moment he is found. If he is 
not, then we will not find our heart's desire by follow-
ing Joy any more than mice will find theirs by pursu-
ing the cat." A writer who thinks this theologically 
sophisticated must simply be left to his own devices 
while the rest of us spend time reading Nygren, Bur-
naby, and D'Arcy-not to mention Augustine. This is 
only one example of Beversluis' use of dilemmas, but 
perhaps Lewis' admirers may be excused for wonder-
ing whether the false dilemma is easily avoided. 
Still, though, a bad book may treat important issues, 
and Beversluis does. He focuses on three sorts of ar-
guments Lewis offers for belief in God. Two of 
them-arguments from the nature of reason and the 
nature of morality-are quite similar; a third-an ar-
gument based on what Lewis called longing for joy-is 
rather different. Each is worth thinking through as 
Beversluis has tried to do. 
Lewis attempts-in Mere Christianity and several of 
his essays-to argue from the nature of our moral ex-
perience to the existence of a divine being, what in 
Mere Christianity he calls "a Something which is direct-
ing the universe, and which appears in me as a law 
urging me to do right and making me feel responsible 
and uncomfortable when I do wrong." Beversluis cor-
rectly notes that Lewis' version of the moral argument 
7 
depends upon two claims: that morality itself is objec-
tive, and that an objective moral law must be 
grounded in a supernatural reality. Lewis begins by 
noting that almost all our moral arguments presup-
pose certain principles. Quarreling, as opposed to 
fighting, loses its point unless we have some shared 
standard in the light of which to conduct our argu-
ment. These standards-what Lewis calls the law of 
nature in Mere Christianity-cannot be subjective; that 
is, they cannot be grounded ultimately in our tastes, 
preferences, attitudes, or decisions. Not if moral argu-
ment is to be meaningful. 
Thus far so good, I think-though Beversluis does 
not. He contends that, when Lewis argues that subjec-
tivist moral theories cannot account for our sense of 
moral obligation or the possibility of moral argument, 
he is guilty of "irresponsible writing." "To give vent to 
so ill-considered an opinion is to betray either that one 
knows next to nothing about ethical theory or that one 
simply chooses to ignore inconvenient points of view." 
(A dilemma again! It is my duty to remind the reader 
that Beversluis seeks only to rescue Lewis from the ex-
cessive hostility of some of his critics.) 
Lewis is mistaken, Beversluis contends, because he 
overlooks objectivist moral theories (from Aristotle to 
the utilitarians) which have gotten along quite well 
without any grounding in the supernatural. One sus-
pects, however, that Beversluis has missed an impor-
tant point. The long list of such objectivist but possibly 
naturalistic moral theories which he offers is, for the 
most part, a list of normative ethical theories. Almost all 
of them could be held, as a normative position, by 
either a subjectivist or an objectivist. Lewis' point in 
this argument is not normative but metaethical. It is 
that, whatever our normative ethic may be, we will not 
do justice to our moral experience if we hold it as a 
matter of taste or preference, attitude or decision of 
principle. Naturally, this claim is arguable and has 
often been argued, but it is neither silly nor naive. I 
suspect, indeed, that it is correct. 
But a moral argument for that Something directing 
the universe needs more than the case for an objective 
moral law; it. needs a Lawgiver. And Lewis does not, 
I think, satisfactorily bridge this gap. Contrary, how-
ever, to what Beversluis and some other readers have 
thought, I am less certain that Lewis really thought he 
had bridged it. How get from the objective moral law 
to the divine lawgiver? In Miracles Lewis suggests that 
if our conscience were itself a product of nature 
(which is nonmoral) , we could have no confidence in 
the objectivity of its judgments. What he means, I 
think, is clearer in Mere Christianity, and it is essentially 
a claim about what best makes sense of our moral ex-
perience. Knowing ourselves to be under a moral law, 
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we have learned something about ourselves that we 
know only as "insiders." An external observer studying 
human behavior could only chart what we do; for an 
understanding of our sense that we act in accord with 
a sense of obligation he would have to rely on our own 
reports. 
That is to say, studying human beings in the way we 
might study cabbages, trees, earthquakes, tides, 
glaciers, or (probably) wolves will not account for 
human moral experience. We cannot explain it in 
terms of natural phenomena or the methods by which 
we examine those phenomena. We can account for it 
only if we assume that there is more to human nature 
than can be found in the rest of the natural world. 
And therefore-and here is the gap that is not, I 
think, really bridged-we cannot account for human 
nature if we understand it as the product of the rest 
of nature. We can account for our moral experience-
a surd in the rest of the natural world--only if we as-
sume that Something beyond the natural world directs 
and communicates with us through our sense of moral 
obligation . 
Studying human beings in the way we 
might study cabbages, trees, 
earthquakes, tides, glaciers, or 
(probably) wolves will not account 
for human moral experience. We cannot 
account for it in terms of natural 
phenomena or natural methods. 
I agree with Beversluis that this final move, at least 
as I have described it, is not rationally conclusive. But 
there is more than that to be said about it. For one 
thing, if as an argument it is not conclusive, as a "con-
sideration sufficient to determine the intellect" (to use 
Mill's phrase), it may still be weighty. What is worth 
noting is the way in which Lewis here appeals to an 
impulse that is very basic to religious belief. If he is 
not giving us an argument which admits of no dis-
agreement, he is providing some sense of why believ-
ers of many stripes have felt that the "lower" cannot 
explain the "higher," however much the great 
evolutionary myth (whose funeral oration Lewis com-
posed in one of his essays) may claim that it can. 
It is not logically impossible that the lower should 
ground the higher, but Lewis has offered one sort of 
consideration which may help us explain our uneasi-
ness with the idea that it does. He is asking us to im-
agine the universe in two quite different ways and 
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consider, then, which most plausibly accounts for our 
experience-and, in particular here, our moral experi-
ence. Notice that this is in many ways not simply an 
argument but an exercise of the imaginative powers 
something like that suggested by Lewis in The Discarded 
Image when he described the medieval model of the 
umverse. 
If the reader will suspend his disbelief and exercise his imag-
ination . . . even for a few minutes, I think he will become 
aware of the vast readjustment involved in a perceptive read-
ing of the old poets. He will find his whole attitude to the 
universe inverted. In modern, that is, in evolutionary, 
thought Man stands at the top of a stair whose foot is lost in 
obscurity; in this, he stands at the bottom of a stair whose top 
is invisible with light. 
It is possible that Lewis never really decided 
whether he was offering only an argument which ap-
pealed to logic or whether he was offering something 
more like a consideration which might incline the in-
tellect to a certain view. At certain places--chiefly in 
Miracles and Mere Christianity-it seems to be the 
former. But in The Problem of Pain he clearly states 
that coming to think of morality in the way he does 
is not required by logical reasoning alone. Someone 
may refuse, he says, "if not without violence to his own 
nature, yet without absurdity." We may miss the truth 
to which our moral experience points, but there is no 
logical argument which can compel us to see it. Simi-
larly, in his essay "Transposition," he suggests that we 
may deliberately refuse "to understand things from 
above" and continue to inhabit a natural world which 
is "all fact and no meaning." It is imagination that is 
the organ of meaning, and we can refuse to image the 
world in certain ways. 
Most important of all, in The Abolition of Man-a 
book sadly underrated and in some ways misun-
derstood by Beversluis-Lewis, having put forward an 
argument for the objectivity of moral norms, writes: "I 
may add that though I myself am a Theist, and indeed 
a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect ar-
gument for Theism." If this contradicts, as it may, the 
thrust of his argument in Mere Christianity, it is 
nevertheless more likely to be his considered position. 
In an essay, "The Poison of Subjectivism," he likewise 
declines to move from the existence of the moral law 
to the existence of God (for the very good theological 
reason that this might seem to make God bound by 
the moral law), and he contents himself with laying 
down "two negations: that God neither obeys nor creates 
the moral law." And, of course, if God does not create 
the moral law, logic cannot require that we move from 
the existence of that law to the existence of God. 
Lewis' argument from reason is very much like his 
argument from morality. He argues-in many of his 
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essays and, especially, in chapter 3 of Miracles-that we 
could never trust the conclusions our rational powers 
reach if reason itself could be fully accounted for as 
the result of irrational causes-which, according to 
Lewis, means that reason could not be explained if it 
were the product of nature. To account for reason we 
must suppose that there is a realm other than the nat-
ural. It is this argument that triggered the famous ex-
change between Lewis and Elizabeth Anscombe, an ex-
change which Beversluis recounts. 
Anscombe targeted two points at which Lewis' argu-
ment was particularly vulnerable. She noted that to say 
that reason was the product of nature might be to say 
that it had nonrational causes, but that was quite dif-
ferent from holding that it was irrationally caused. 
This objection, though on target, is easily dealt with. 
One simply changes the argument to read non- rather 
than ir-rational. But this leaves us with the more cru-
cial issue: Is it plausible that our rational faculty 
should have grown out of or been produced by a 
"lower," nonrational world? Anscombe argued that 
there was no logical reason why this should not hap-
pen. For Lewis to claim, as he had, that the validity of 
our reasoning (and the naturalist's reasoning) would 
be undercut if reason were the product of nonrational 
nature was, Anscombe correctly noted, to confuse 
reasons and causes. Whatever the cause of our reasoned 
conclusions, their validity cannot be determined simply 
by tracing the causes which moved us to think this 
way. 
The old joke about the man whose car got a flat tire 
in front of a mental institution makes Anscombe's 
point: Changing the tire, the man had the misfortune 
to have all four lugs roll off the road and into a ditch 
where he could not find them. Cursing his misfortune, 
the man was helped by the timely suggestion of an in-
mate who had been watching. Why not, the resident 
of the institution suggested, take one lug from each of 
the other three wheels and secure each tire with three 
lugs until he could get to the nearest town. The obvi-
ous sanity of this solution impressed the man and he 
thanked the inmate while quite obviously failing to 
keep from his face a look of surprise that such a ra-
tional solution should have come from this source. 
"Well look," responded the inmate, "I may be mad, 
but I'm not crazy." Who knows why he offered the 
suggestion, what delusion may have led him to inter-
vene? Whatever the cause, the rationality of his sug-
gestion did not depend on it. 
Lewis realized that Anscombe had fingered a serious 
weakness in the argument, which he revised in a later 
edition of Miracles. But he continued to believe that 
the argument had a point. An argument's validity, he 
granted, is a function solely of the structure of the ar-
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gument itself. That validity cannot be determined by 
investigating the causes which led the arguer to think 
in this way. Nevertheless , Lewis noted, when I think a 
valid thought, the event of my thinking (though not 
the thought's validity) is subject to explanation in 
terms of nonrational causes. Suppose my thinking this 
(valid) thought can be fully accounted for in terms of 
nonrational causes, is this ground for worry? Lewis 
thought so; for in that case it would be a felicitous but 
accidental circumstance if I happened to be caused to 
think what (on other grounds having to do with the 
structure of the argument) we know to be true. 
That Lewis has a point seems clear, though here, as 
in the argument from morality, I think it is not so 
much a conclusive argument as a consideration which 
might help to determine the intellect. Beversluis, on 
the other hand, thinks it largely worthless. He notes 
that events can be explained in many different ways 
and from many points of view. They can even, he 
says, be "fully" explained from any given point of view 
without invalidating other perspectives. 
Take the string quartets of Beethoven. There is a sense in 
which one would be on perfectly safe ground in claiming that 
they can be fully accounted for in purely causal terms. Beet-
hoven, one might say, composed them because of an irresis-
tible creative urge that allowed him to do nothing else even 
to the point of neglecting his health and business affairs. He 
was "driven" to compose music. In this sense, his string quar-
tets are, in principle, fully explicable in terms of his 
psychological and temperamental makeup. Fully but not 
merely. 
"Fully means 'exhaustively' only from a particular point of 
view." Other explanations, almost without limit, are 
also possible: 
He needed extra money, he was bent on convincing his critics 
that his deafness had not deprived him of his creative talent, 
he was trying to catch up with Haydn, he was obsessed with 
composing for string instruments, and so on. All these expla-
nations "fully explicate" the composition of the quartets. But 
they are not mutually exclusive. They are not even in com-
petition. 
Beversluis' view is .possible, but hardly as obvious as he 
suggests. Not everyone will be satisfied to understand 
"fully" to mean "exhaustively, but only from a particu-
lar point of view." For this leads to the possible but 
puzzling circumstance which continued to worry 
Lewis: that the event of my thinking a true thought 
(true according to the canons of rational argument) 
might be fully explained as the product of nonrational 
causes. Possible-and therefore Lewis can offer no 
conclusive argument to the contrary. Possible, but a 
felicitous happenstance-and therefore Lewis does 
offer a consideration which might again lead one to 
wonder whether anything less than Reason could ex-
plain reason, whether the "higher" could be 
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adequately explained in terms of the "lower." Lewis 
would never have denied that our thinking was condi-
tioned by many nonrational causes, but he con-
tinued-with good reason-to puzzle over a view 
which tried to "fully explain" thought in such terms. 
Lewis' third argument is quite a different one, and 
it grows out of the Augustinian and Romantic ele-
ments in his thought; it is the argument from desire. 
Here again, Beversluis sees that the argument is not a 
conclusive proof, but he is largely blinded to its signifi-
cance. The theme of "longing for joy" is present in 
many of Lewis' writings and is developed most sys-
tematically in Pilgrim's Regress, Surprised by joy, and 
"The Weight of Glory." It is, in large part, St. Augus-
tine's theme: "you have made us for yourself, and our 
hearts are restless until they can find peace in you." 
People may try various possible 
satisfactions, but these will all 
fail to satisfy. They will then, if 
they are honest to their experience, 
be led to conclude that the human 
heart must be made for a joy greater 
than any finite object. 
Beversluis creates distinctions which are for the most 
part artificial between Lewis' development of this 
theme in different writings. The nature of the argu-
ment itself is reasonably clear: Human beings, if they 
will investigate honestly the longing of their hearts, 
will find within themselves a desire which no finite ob-
ject can satisfy. They may try various possible satisfac-
tions-pleasure, power, knowledge, fame-but these 
will all, finally, fail to satisfy. They will then, if they 
are honest to their experience, be led to conclude that 
the human heart must be made for a joy greater than 
any finite object. 
Now it is no very powerful philosophic achievement 
to see the weakness in this argument, stated as baldly 
as I have put it. Lewis himself sees, as Beversluis 
notes, that the argument will work only if we add the 
premise which Lewis several times quotes from Aristo-
tle: "nature makes nothing in vain." If we find our-
selves with a longing which no finite object can satisfy, 
and if such a longing natural to human nature cannot 
be in vain and must have its fulfillment, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that there must be something 
beyond the natural world which will satisfy this long-
ing. This is a reasonable conclusion but not the only 
possible conclusion. We might also conclude-as has 
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been the modern fashion-that the world is absurd and 
the human being a vain and futile creature, driven by 
a longing which cannot be satisfied. We might picture 
the human being not as St. Augustine did but as the 
Faustian man who could never find a moment in 
which to rest the heart, a moment so lovely that he 
would say to it: "stay a while." Lewis recognizes this 
possibility but thinks there is good reason (even if not 
conclusive reason) to side with Augustine. He raises 
the question and offers his answer in a paragraph in 
"The Weight of Glory." 
Do what they will, then, we remain conscious of a desire 
which no natural happiness will satisfy. But is there any 
reason to suppose that reality offers any satisfaction to it? 
"Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread ." But 
I think it may be urged that this misses the point. A man's 
physical hunger does not prove that that man will get any 
bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But 
surely a man's hunger does prove that he comes of a race 
which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where 
eatable substances exist. In the same way, though I do not be-
lieve (I wish I did) that my desire for Paradise proves that I 
shall enjoy it, I think it a pretty good indication that such a 
thing exists and that some men will. A man may love a 
woman and not win her; but it would be very odd if the 
phenomenon called "falling in love" occurred in a sexless 
world. 
Beversluis, commenting on just this paragraph, in-
sists-rightly, no doubt-that the fact of hunger does 
not prove there is food. But would we be entirely 
foolish and unreasonable to think, with Lewis, that it 
offers "a pretty good indication" that there is some-
thing like food? We would not. Though, to be sure, 
we would from the start be presupposing that our uni-
verse was not a vain and futile place-presupposing, 
that is, something like the end we hoped to dem-
onstrate. 
The argument is really an invitation, and it is no ac-
cident that "The Weight of Glory" is a sermon in 
which Lewis admits that he is trying "to weave a spell." 
But, as he tells his listeners, "remember your fairy 
tales. Spells are used for breaking enchantments as 
well as for inducing them. And you and I have need 
of the strongest spell that can be found to wake us 
from the evil enchantment of worldiness which has 
been laid upon us for nearly a hundred years." For 
Beversluis, however, the argument is "simply adoles-
cent disenchantment elevated to cosmic status." Well, 
that is possible. But if the argument is an invitation, 
we will have to consider it and see what we think. 
Lewis does not suppose that he is exploring an experi-
ence which is solely his own or just having an attack 
of adolescent nostalgia. He supposes that if we 
examine our heart we will find there-manifested no 
doubt in quite different ways-the longing he writes of 
and seeks to evoke. 
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At a lesser level we could say of his argument here 
what Dorothy Sayers wrote of Dante: "The Commedia 
is at the same time intensely personal and magnifi-
cently public. . .. Dante's experience is personal, but 
it is not in the least private; it is universal, and he in-
tends it to be thus understood." Dante's love for Beat-
rice leads him to God, but, of course-and this is part 
of Beversluis' criticism-some loves might lead away 
from rather than to God. How shall we distinguish 
that desire which is truly part of our created nature, 
the desire for the fulfillment proper to creatures such 
as we are, the desire for God-how distinguish this 
from desires which, because they finally lead away 
from God, must be termed profoundly unnatural? 
Sayers offers a clue: "There is no more insidious 
enemy of the true Beatrice than the false Beatrice who 
bears to her so deceptive a superficial likeness. The 
two are distinguished most readily and surely by their 
effects-the false images turning for ever inwards in 
narrowing circles of egotism; the true working for 
ever outwards to embrace the Creator and all crea-
tion." There again, in effect, is the invitation: to see 
whether any object other than God can truly satisfy 
the desire of our heart and, in satisfying it, enrich, 
broaden, and purify our love. 
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As an apologist for the faith, Lewis does more than 
offer these three arguments for believing in God's 
existence; he also considers-and is troubled by-one 
of the strongest arguments against God's existence: the 
fact of evil and pain in our world. We are tempted to 
think that a God both wholly good and all-powerful 
should have been able to do better. One of Lewis' first 
apologetic works, The Problem of Pain, was devoted to 
this question, and he continued to probe it in some of 
his later writings, especially Till We Have Faces and A 
Grief Observed. 
Beversluis, ever given to simplifying matters for his 
non-philosophical readers, divides the possibilities into 
two positions, which he terms Platonist and Ockhamist. 
The Platonist in his sense "holds that the term good 
when applied to God cannot mean something radically 
different from what it means when applied to men." 
If God is to be called good, it will have to be in our 
ordinary sense, and there can be no special pleading 
that permits God to do what we ordinarily call evil. 
For the Ockhamist in Beversluis' sense, the word "good 
when applied to God does mean something radically 
different from what it means when applied to human 
beings." Beversluis is persuaded that an orthodox 
Christian must be an Ockhamist. "Orthodox Christians 
unhesitatingly affirm that obedience to God is absolute 
and unconditional. He is to be obeyed because he is 
God, not because we have judged him good by some 
human standard." (Again, we should keep reminding 
ourselves that it is Lewis who is guilty of oversimplifi-
cation.) 
Indeed, the Platonist and Ockhamist positions, thus 
described, so fully circumscribe the boundaries of pos-
sible positions that Beversluis can quickly confront 
Lewis with a dilemma: "either Lewis is a Platonist or 
he is not. If he is, then he should insist upon the or-
dinary meanings of ethical terms and draw whatever 
conclusions about God's goodness they require. If he 
is not, then he is of course free to redefine ethical 
terms in any way he sees fit. But in redefining them, 
he is no longer operating within our shared moral vo-
cabulary .. .. " 
Beversluis contends that late in his life Lewis tried 
to switch from his earlier Platonist view. Overcome by 
grief at the loss of his wife, Lewis struggled to believe 
that God was good in the face of such loss-and fi-
nally, and somewhat pathetically, held on to faith by 
declining to judge God according to our ordinary stand-
ards of goodness. This, at any rate, is Beversluis' 
claim. The shift in Lewis' thinking comes in A Grief 
Observed, or, more precisely pinpointed, half way 
through the book. In the first half of the book Lewis 
is still the old Platonist; in the second half "everything 
changes" and he switches to an Ockhamist view. True, 
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even in the last half of the book his acceptance of Ock-
hamism is "half-hearted"; of course, he still casts 
"wistful backward glances at the Platonic view"; in-
deed, he himself "was apparently not aware of the de-
cisive reversal of his thought in the second half of this 
book." 
What shall we say of this thesis? That Beversluis' 
credentials as a serious expositor are more than ever 
in doubt. Lewis may or may not have managed to deal 
effectively with the problem of evil, but Beversluis' ar-
gument can hardly be accepted. It is important to re-
member that for Lewis there is no problem of pain ex-
cept for the believer. We do not come to faith only if 
we solve this problem; rather, having been driven to 
believe on other grounds, we then have two awkward 
facts-pain and God-with which to come to terms. 
We may say that faith "creates, rather than solves, the 
problem of pain, for pain would be no problem unless 
side by side with our daily experience of this painful 
world, we had received what we think a good assur-
ance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving." 
If, then, we come to believe in a God of goodness, 
love, and mercy, how shall we deal with the fact of 
pain? Lewis was never either Platonist or Ockhamist in 
the simple senses used by Beversluis. In The Problem of 
Pain Lewis set forth a position which, though he 
deepened, he never gave up. God's goodness cannot 
be utterly different from our understanding of good-
ness, for then we could mean little by calling him 
good. Yet, at the same time, any believer will admit 
that what seems to us good may often not really be 
good in the eyes of a holy and wise God. This means 
that the believer, having experienced not only pain but 
also the goodness and beauty of his Lord, is commit-
ted to a journey, a pilgrimage: gradually coming to 
know better the God whose goodness he trusts. The 
image of growth was present already in The Problem of 
Pain, where Lewis uses an analogy from human ex-
perience. Suppose that a "man of inferior moral stand-
ards enters the society of those who are better and 
wiser than he and gradually learns to accept their stand-
ards," how shall we describe his journey into self-
understanding? He does not think that he has simply 
been asked to give up his own views about goodness; 
rather, he sees that he is gradually moving in the di-
rection of greater goodness. His standards are gradu-
ally transformed and, sometimes, even reversed, but 
he himself recognizes that he is moving toward the 
good. 
lt is in the light of such experiences that we must consider 
the goodness of God. Beyond all doubt, His idea of "good-
ness" differs from ours; but you need have no fear that, as 
you approach it, you will be asked simply to reverse your 
moral standards. When the relevant difference between the 
Divine ethics and your own appears to you, you will not, in 
The Cresset 
fact, be in any doubt that the change demanded of you is in 
the direction you already call "better." The Divine "goodness" 
differs from ours, but it is not sheerly different: it differs 
from ours not as white from black but as a perfect circle from 
a child's first attempt to draw a wheel. But when the child has 
learned to draw, it will know that the circle it then makes is 
what it was trying to make from the very beginning. 
One could devote a lifetime to learning to draw that 
perfect circle, and, similarly, the believer devotes an 
entire life to coming to know better the goodness-in-
deed, the strange goodness-of God. The believer is 
not likely to-and certainly need not-live out this 
journey in the way Beversluis says an "orthodox Chris-
tian" must: "Good soldiers do not raise searching ques-
tions about their orders; they obey them." The be-
liever may prefer familial imagery: loving the parent, 
and being assured on other grounds that the parent 
wishes nothing but good for him, he may nevertheless 
often struggle to trust the parent whose goodness is 
not mere kindness and is not, therefore, always readily 
apparent. 
lewis powerfully depicts the necessary 
but painful transformation of our 
natural loves as they are taken up 
into a life of love for God. This 
process, the conversion of our natural 
loves into modes of charity, "will 
always involve a kind of death." 
Lewis' later writings powerfully depict such struggle. 
If God intends that we should reach the fulfillment 
for which we are created, that we should delight fully 
in and give ourselves wholly to him, our swollen egos 
are often reluctant to see this journey through. For 
Lewis our reluctance is usually grounded in possessive-
ness. To put it simply, we love other things and people 
more than we love God, and we struggle with all our 
might to hang on to them and find a sense in which 
to call them "ours." They are created goods, gifts of 
God, and it is not bad to love them; indeed, not to feel 
"the tether and pang of the particular" would be less 
than human. But because, in St. Augustine's terms, we 
love them inordinately, we suffer when we lose them-
even if that loss is part of our journey toward fulfill-
ment in God. 
In The Four Loves Lewis powerfully depicts the 
necessary but painful transformation of our natural 
loves as they are taken up into a life of love for God. 
This process, the conversion of our natural loves and 
transformation of them into modes of charity, "will al-
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ways involve a kind of death." But here again, painful 
as this "kind of death" may be, Lewis sees it as part 
of the believer's pilgrimage toward God, part of the 
journey by which we come to know better the good-
ness of God. The image of the perfect circle and the 
child's first attempt to draw, used by Lewis in The 
Problem of Pain, is given a human face in The Four 
Loves. 
We were made for God. Only by being in some respect like 
Him, only by being a manifestation of His beauty, loving 
kindness, wisdom, or goodness, has any earthly Beloved ex-
cited our love. It is not that we have loved them too much, 
but that we did not quite understand what we were loving. 
It is not that we shall be asked to turn from them, so dearly 
familiar, to a Stranger. When we see the face of God we shall 
know that we have always known it. 
First, though, we ourselves must get a human face. 
Lewis' most haunting depiction of the movement to-
ward God is in Till We Have Faces. Orual, overcome by 
the cruelty of the gods who seem to take from us all 
whom we love, writes her book and makes her case 
against the gods. Our misery, she writes, is that there 
should be gods at all, for there's not room in the same 
world for them and us. (Notice that this is simply a 
powerful way of phrasing what Beversluis regards as 
the "orthodox Christian" view: that God and human 
beings do not share a common moral world.) But the 
gods have the last word, and good for Orual that they 
do. She comes-most painfully-to learn that the 
problem lay in the possessive quality of her loves. Be-
cause her loves were swollen and bloated, because she 
was struggling to live independently and fashion life 
solely according to her own conception of goodness, 
the process of transformation could only be painful. 
She could not come to know the gods and see their 
beauty fully until she herself, having given up the fal-
sifying illusion of independence, was truly able to see. 
"How can they meet us face to face till we have faces?" 
Orual has been stripped naked before the gods, the 
carefully crafted speech that had lain at the center of 
her soul for years has been revealed for the sham it 
is, when she finally meets the god. And then, nothing 
remains to be said. 
I ended my first book with the words no answer. I know now, 
Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer. 
Before your face questions die away. What other answer 
would suffice? Only words, words; to be led out to battle 
against other words. 
One might picture this as Beversluis' Ockhamist 
capitulating before God, but it would be an insensitive 
reader indeed who ended Till We Have Faces thinking 
that. Sacrifice indeed-that Orual must make. But she 
sees that the god is beautiful though dreadful, and she 
sees that she too has become beautiful. She has be-
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come, that is, what she had always wanted to be-
every bit as much a fruition of her desire as the per-
fect circle completes the child's first attempt at draw-
ing. Her knowledge of the gods has been deepened 
and transformed until she sees what readers of Narnia 
learn about the great lion Asian: that though he's no 
tame lion and could hardly be called safe, he is good. 
If any reader of The Four Loves and Till We Have 
Faces is still able to believe that a crucial shift in Lewis' 
thinking takes place at the midpoint of A Grief Observed 
... well, we must consign such a reader to Beversluis. 
Powerful as it is, A Grief Observed continues and devel-
ops the line of thought already set forth decades ear-
lier in The Problem of Pain: only because we believe on 
other grounds in a good God does pain seem such a 
problem. A good God, who is more than a kindly fel-
low and who truly desires for us the fulfillment of our 
nature, will be neither tame nor safe. But the process 
of coming to know that God ever more fully, if we 
persevere on our journey even in the face of great 
temptation to lose heart, will find its completion when 
we see the face on which we have always longed to 
look-not the face of a stranger but the face which we 
ourselves know to be both good and beautiful. Even 
then, though, a face terrible in its goodness. For, as 
Lewis wrote more than a decade before Asian came 
bounding into the Narnia stories, 
I think the lion, when he has ceased to be dangerous, will still 
be awful: indeed, that we shall then first see that of which the 
present fangs and claws are a clumsy, and satanically per-
verted, imitation. There will still be something like the shak-
ing of a golden mane: and often the good Duke will say, "Let 
him roar again." 
To set the Christian life into the context of a journey 
toward a Goodness that is alien yet recognizable as 
good is to be relieved of Beversluis' false dilemma be-
tween Platonist and Ockhamist. 
But it is not, of course, to be relieved of the perils 
of the journey itself. Throughout, the struggle to offer 
in concert both mind and heart to God will be just 
that-a struggle. And despite the weaknesses, in-
adequacies, even faults in Lewis' writings and person, 
those who come to the writings for guidance along the 
way will not, I think, be seriously misled and will often 
be helped immeasurably. The truth about the journey, 
and the truth about the relation of mind and heart in 
the Christian life, must finally be lived. Lewis' own for-
mulation suggests as much: "In relation to the 
philosophical premises, a Christian's faith is of course 
excessive: in relation to what is sometimes shown him, 
it is perhaps just as often defective." That was written 
by a man who believed what the children in Narnia 
learn about Asian: that the longer you know him the 
bigger he gets. Cl 
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Stone by Log by Tree 
It's like winter out of season 
As I journey down to the creek side, 
The way stiff with weeds 
And the tree branches 
Stubborn cobwebs on my arms and face. 
Along this path violets used to grow 
In twos and threes or soft circles, 
And I'd gather them, tiny stems at the stalks, 
Until my hands were all flowers. 
When I drove into town today 
How surprised I was 
To find the way everything had narrowed, bleared-
A mere smudge of the town I remembered. 
It was as if all the buildings 
Had grown quiet and withdrawn. 
I found the road to the house quicker, 
The driveway shorter. 
The house itself seemed too cramped 
For all the things I'd planned there, 
Each room small and strange in shadow, 
Its ghosts gone. 
Down here my song had been 
Stone by log by tree. 
It had been like breathing. 
I'd say it as I gathered a sprawl 
Of gooseberries from its bent over the path. 
Sometimes I'd sit underneath 
The mulberry tree at the wood's opening, 
Its headdress dotting and purpling the shade. 
Now the stretch of green over the bank 
I used to think of as the world 
Is amazingly near. 
In this sad, cold air 
The loud buzz of workers 
Unraveling new houses on its edge 
Is plain and dissonant, 
Spoiling the quiet green. 
By the creek side where I used to lie 
I find bark falling off the trees in chunks 
Soft and settled with ants 
And the clearing that had always come 
Stone by log by tree 
Thick with weeds. 
If only I could find some violet-colored things 
And bury my head in them. 
Kim Bridgford 
The Cresset 
David Paul Nord 
THE EDIFICE OF ACADEME 
A Meditation on Research, Teaching, and Service 
(Editor's Note: Readers of The Cresset may by now 
find themselves surfeited by articles on academic life. We urge 
them, however, not to turn away from Mr. Nord's pathbreak-
ing essay on the assumption that it involves just another gloss 
on the academic vocation. Careful readers will, we are sure, 
be stimulated and rewarded by the philosophical subtlety and 
analytical rigor of Mr. Nord's meditation. Having read this 
article, they will never be able to think about academic life 
in quite the same way again.) 
Ancient thinkers supposed the world to be com-
posed of four fundamental elements. We in the mod-
ern academy know better. There are only three: re-
search, teaching, and service. All human action and 
the fruits thereof can be defined by these three basic 
elements. This is the natural law by which we live. 
But might it be possible that this tripartite division 
of academic action is actually not natural law at all, but 
is rather a kind of Kuhnian paradigm, a brilliant but 
perhaps fallible social construct? I have given that 
question a great deal of thought over the past year, 
and I'm obliged by professional duty to report that for 
a while I thought I had discerned a crack in the 
edifice of academic orthodoxy. How I discovered this 
philosophical crack and what I did about it is a compli-
cated story, closely associated with my efforts to pro-
duce something called a "Tenure Dossier" and with it 
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paraiso University, he went on to earn his M.A. in American 
History at the University of Minnesota and his Ph.D. in 
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a document called a "Personal Statement." I hasten to 
add at this point for the philosophically faint-at-heart 
that this is a story with a happy ending. The edifice 
is not in danger of collapse, and in fact the very pro-
duction of this article may well have been the salvation 
of it. How can that be, you ask. Well, here's my story. 
Academics know that all human activity 
can be defined by three elements-
research, teaching, and service. 
Last fall it was given to me to "go up" for tenure at 
Indiana University. Prior to that time, I had had no 
difficulty working within the paradigmatic world of re-
search, teaching, and service. In this world, as I had 
come to understand it, everything was perfectly clear 
and quintessentially well ordered. Some things were 
research, some were teaching, some were service. In 
fact, in the last year or so I had become something of 
an expert on the subject, or at least a bit of a buff. For 
after-dinner amusement, I would ask people to name 
the most bizarre, obscure, or complex activity they had 
ever heard of at a university, and then I would in-
stantly classify it (correctly, of course) as research, 
teaching, or service. I had, in short, developed the 
academic/bureaucratic equivalent of perfect pitch. 
With this in mind, I expected that the preparation 
of the Tenure Dossier would be a very simple and 
routine exercise. As I began to gather together mate-
rial to stuff into file folders, I knew instinctively that 
I would need only three different colors of file folder 
labels. Each folder would be numbered; each would 
fall under one of the three prefix codes: R, T, and S. 
Given my proclivity for academic taxonomy, the place-
ment of books, book chapters, articles, papers, 
abstracts, proposals, reviews, summaries, elaborations, 
letters, memos, documents, syllabuses, handouts, notes, 
votes, statements, evaluations, comments, observations, 
reports, indexes, lists, maps, and Christmas cards was 
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easy. 
But then, as I was wntmg the Personal Statement, 
I had a disquieting thought. (The Personal Statement 
is a kind of intellectual autobiography that goes at the 
beginning of the Tenure Dossier.) If everything is re-
search, teaching, or service, what was the Personal 
Statement? It was clearly a "paper" of some sort, but 
it seemed to be neither research nor teaching nor serv-
ice. The three parts of the Personal Statement were 
about research, teaching, and service, but no part 
seemed to be the thing itself. Yet there I was doing it. 
There I was writing something that was not research, 
not teaching, not service. My mind reeled. Had I come 
upon something genuinely new? Was this indeed a 
previously undiscovered academic quark? Realizing the 
explosive potential of such a discovery, I resolved to 
keep it secret until I had done my best to explore it 
and to resolve its mystery through the application of 
academic normal science and bureaucratic conven-
tional wisdom. I began the search for epicycles. 
My first step in trying to understand the phenome-
non was to apply conventional nomenclature. I had 
learned in my years in academe that this is often a 
convenient way to force-fit new phenomena into old, 
time-tested categories. Clearly, I postulated, what I was 
dealing with here was metaresearch, metateaching, 
and metaservice. Just hearing the sounds of the words 
and seeing their division into three familiar categories 
eased my mind quite a lot. But I was even more re-
lieved as I began my analysis, because I knew that I 
had dealt with something like metaresearch before. I 
had written a chapter about historical research for a 
textbook on mass communication research. It wasn't 
research itself; it was merely about research. This piece 
was easily classified in the Dossier as teaching. There-
fore, it seemed perfectly logical and safe to generalize: 
Metaresearch is teaching. Similarly, I had once given 
a convention paper on teaching methods, and that was 
easily classified as professional service. Therefore, I 
was able further to generalize: Metateaching is service. 
I breathed a sigh of relief. Two-thirds of the mystery 
was solved. Both metaresearch and metateaching could 
be subsumed under the conventional categories teach-
ing and service. (More intriguingly, I realized that I 
may have discerned heretofore unexplored links 
among the three elements. More on that later.) 
But what about metaservice? If metaresearch is 
teaching, and metateaching is service, what is metaser-
vice? Naturally, my first instinct was to hypothesize 
that metaservice must be research. Philosophical sym-
metry and scientific parsimony would seem to demand 
it. If the system were to remain closed and symmetri-
cal (i.e. , beautiful), it must be reflexive and turn back 
on itself in fugue-like fashion. But, try as I might, I 
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could not demonstrate, either logically or experimen-
tally, that writing about service (metaservice) was re-
search . This was the conceptual chasm I could not 
cross. Metaservice indeed seemed to be that thing in 
academe that we all fear most: something genuinely 
new. 
If metametaservice is service, 
metaservice must be service as well, 
for without the latter the former 
could not exist. But does 
metametaservice exist in fact or 
might it be merely a figment of my 
own fevered imagination? 
But wait! If writing about service in the Personal 
Statement was metaservice, I reasoned, what would 
happen if I were to write about the writing about ser-
vice? That is, could there exist metametaservice, and if 
so what would it be? It seemed possible that 
metametaservice might be a species of service itself. 
Clearly this did not seem to be the case with mere 
metaservice, for surely there could be no value (ser-
vice) to anyone in reading about someone else's ser-
vice. But there might be value (service) in reading 
what someone else has written about writing about ser-
vice (metametaservice), because writing about service 
(metaservice) is something every academic must at 
some point do. And, ipso facto, if metametaservice is 
service, metaservice must be service as well, for with-
out the latter the former could not exist. But does 
metametaservice exist in fact, or might it be merely a 
figment of my own fevered imagination? 
I didn't know the answer to that question, but I 
knew what I had to do. I knew that I had a profes-
sional duty to report my findings to my colleagues in 
the academy-though the heavens should fall in the 
process. So I began-sadly, reluctantly, but profession-
ally-to write this article. And then, in a flash of bril-
liant light, the scales fell from my eyes. In writing this 
very article, I was in fact performing metametaservice. 
The article was about metaservice, so it was itself 
metametaservice. Thus, metametaservice was not a 
mere imagining; it actually could exist and did exist in 
the true material world of academe-on a piece of 
paper. In other words, at that very moment, I was dem-
onstrating experimentally that metametaservice did 
exist. Moreover, I had already determined logically 
that if metametaservice did exist it would be service, 
and that metaservice is a component of metametaser-
vice. Therefore, metaservice is service as well! My 
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gloom vanished. Far from destroying the elemental 
~ara?igm of research, teaching, and service, my inves-
tigation had, through its very existence, confirmed it. 
In short, upon this article, the academic edifice would 
stand! 
How many assistant professors can say 
that it has been given to them to 
save academe from conceptual 
catastrophe? Few, I would surmise. 
But what next? For me, probably 
nothing. Now that I'm tenured, I plan 
never to think of such things again. 
Of course, this whole experience has been the 
apogee of my professional life. How many assistant 
professors can say that it has been given to them to 
save academe from conceptual catastrophe? Few, I 
~ould surmise. But what next? For me, probably noth-
mg. Because my tenure case was approved, I plan 
never to think of such things again. In the post-tenure 
twilight ?f my career, memories must suffice. For my-
self, I will always remain humbly grateful to have had 
the honor of demonstrating the unity of metaresearch 
and teaching, and metateaching and service. I am also 
proud of my role in the elaboration of the theory of 
metametaservice. But for those who follow, there is 
much work still to be done. While my theories are use-
ful (i.e., heuristically fertile and paradigmatically 
strategic), I do not believe that they represent the end 
of theory in this area. For example, I leave to minds 
more agile and untenured than mine the exploration 
of metametaresearch and metametateaching. 
Yet it is beyond these obvious areas for further 
study that the real opportunities lie. I believe in the 
marrow of my bones that one day human-kind will de-
velop a unified field theory of academic action : One 
day research, teaching, and service will be shown to be 
aspects of a single, fundamental force. I believe that 
my own investigations into academic metatheory 
clearly suggest that there exists a unity of research and 
teaching (the strong force). Further, I am convinced 
t~at service (the weak force) will also one day be 
hoked to the strong force , and that this link will be es-
tablished through the metaservice-research connection 
t~at my theo~y has predicted. While none of us may 
hve to see this glorious day, I think we can all agree 
that the establishment of this link is crucial for the fu-
ture of academic action, for only this will produce the 
sort of closed, circular, simplistic system that we 
academics can umierstand. •• •• 
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The Poet Asks for a Raise 
(for Dean Dave Schramm) 
Metaphors balanced on my lap, 
I wait for speech. 
The dim light stripes your desk 
where dot charts and AAUP graphs 
are arranged like new linen. 
We worry over form and the liturgy 
of dissent, 
agree on Lorrie's coffee, 
and settle in silence, 
rehearsing litanies of yes and no 
in rhythms of private agonies 
or moments of glad grace. 
The Basque shepherd has set up his trailer 
on the hill across the road. 
The sheep draw us out, 
and we eagerly chart their brown waves 
up the burnt hills where they browse 
in sage and mesquite. 
The poplars below the bluff 
stand in shadow, 
and in our mind's eye we see the sun 
slide into the blue Pacific 
sending long fingers of mist 
up the barrancas. 
Our collection of words and dreams 
jingle in our minds like old coins 
and fall like bells from the dark rocks 
where the sheep move easily, 
their small mouths moving 
over the wet grass. 
And in the dark office 
we do not move or talk, 
the pulse of your cigarette counterpoint 
to the pale magenta of the bougainvillea 
that rustles against the cooling glass. 
J. T. Ledbetter 
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Jill Baumgaertner 
MY LIFE ON THE FRINGE 
A Report from the Lutheran-Evangelical Frontier 
Recently, I received a letter from an irate reader 
whose poem The Cresset had not accepted for publica-
tion. Among other things, this individual asked indig-
nantly, "Who are you?" implying a final "anyway." For 
the first time I realized that my ties to Valparaiso Uni-
versity, although I feel them strongly, might not be re-
membered by the majority of Cresset readers. Time 
also has a way of blurring connections between faces 
and names, as I am reminded each time I grope for 
the name of a former student who has plopped herself 
down in my office, eager to tell me of her new life 
beyond the B.A. 
It has been eleven years since my husband and I left 
Valparaiso. At that time we could still pack all of our 
belongings into a small U-Haul truck and our children 
into car seats. His law degree was brand new. My final 
graduate degree was still six years away. Now, to our 
utter amazement (and, I'm sure, to the amazement of 
students who remember our children toddling around 
the Alumni Hall director's apartment in the early 70s), 
we find ourselves the parents of teenagers, one of 
whom is looking at prospective colleges this year. 
Friends often assume that I graduated from Valpo, 
but Valpo never awarded me any degrees-nor did I 
ever attend classes as a student. I was, however, hired 
in 1969 at a tender age and with a fresh M.A. to teach 
in the English Department. I will be forever grateful 
to Paul Phipps for taking such a scandalous chance 
with me, for I know that I probably received much 
more than I was able to give in those first difficult but 
rewarding years of teaching. During that time I 
realized that teaching was indeed my calling and that 
in order to continue, I needed to pursue a doctorate 
in my field. So in many significant ways I feel that I 
did graduate from Valparaiso University. 
Jill Baumgaertner teaches English at Wheaton College. She 
serves The Cresset as Poetry Editor and as a reviewer of 
contemporary fiction. 
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Some of my friends at Valpo and in my congrega-
tion, Grace Lutheran Church in River Forest, have 
been politely curious about my current academic affili-
ation with Wheaton College, an evangelical school 
where my present responsibilities include teaching the 
creative writing, poetry writing, and fiction writing 
courses. The other Lutheran on the faculty is a 
member of the Art Department and we frequently 
find ourselves assigned to the same committees. We 
joke sometimes that it is because the college feels more 
comfortable knowing that we are both in the same 
place at the same time, but actually, it is simply effi-
cient to have us there together. Between the two of us 
we fill the roles of token artist, token woman, token 
poet, and token Democrat-and we also represent the 
entire membership of the Lutheran caucus, which so 
far has not been too strident, but, well, you know Lu-
therans. Anything could happen. 
Some of my Lutheran friends have been 
politely curious about my current 
academic affiliation with Wheaton 
College, an evangelical institution. 
My Lutheran affiliation has pushed me into some 
peculiar situations at Wheaton. I was recently asked to 
plan a Reformation service to take place during chapel 
sometime this fall, but I was instructed not to include 
a message. I think that means that the organizer 
wanted to expose the students to liturgical worship 
without taking time for a homily, but it does make me 
wonder if he understands what the Reformation was 
all about. I am concerned about the nature of worship 
at Wheaton. Sometimes chapel content seems a bit 
thin, but-and this is important-! am not the only 
one at Wheaton talking about this. There is a con-
certed effort among many individuals to improve the 
quality of worship, and because there is a school chap-
lain, but no chapel hierarchy, change will proba-
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bly be easier at Wheaton than at an institution with a 
more bureaucratic setup. Under the circumstances that 
now exist at Wheaton, the innovators often come from 
the most surprising places. During Holy Week this 
past year, for example, I attended one of the most 
profoundly moving services I have ever experienced, 
sponsored not by the Department of Religion or the 
chaplain's office, but by the Department of Biology. 
These services take place in auditoriums or lecture 
halls and I must admit that I do often yearn for the 
beauty of the Chapel of the Resurrection. There is no 
doubt about it. The spirit is uplifted by the presence 
of sacred space. 
I discovered that Wheaton students 
are, like my students at Valparaiso, 
hardworking, earnest, intelligent 
young men and women. The difference 
is that, like the faculty, all 
Wheaton students must be Christian 
in order to be admitted. 
I was not sure at first about my place at Wheaton, 
or if I would be interested in staying beyond the year 
for which I was initially hired. I was skeptical about, 
among other things, the statement of responsibility 
which all faculty and students must sign, pledging to 
abstain from smoking and drinking. It sounded suspi-
ciously legalistic. But I was impressed with what I saw 
happening in the English Department and with the 
college-wide commitment to the integration of faith 
and learning. It seemed to me that Wheaton was tak-
ing very seriously its Christian base-at the same time 
being careful to avoid the pitfalls into which fun-
damentalist schools like Bob Jones University have fal-
len. As for the rules-they still seem legalistic to me, 
but I also understand that they encourage a disci-
plined lifestyle which is a part of Wheaton's cultural 
heritage. 
I discovered that Wheaton students are, like my stu-
dents at Valparaiso, hardworking, earnest, intelligent 
young men and women. The difference is that, like 
the faculty, all Wheaton students must be Christian in 
order to be admitted. (Faculty members must even 
participate in a faith and learning seminar before 
being considered for tenure, and write a paper on the 
relationship of one's faith to one's discipline.) Occa-
sionally, I have found the homogeneity overwhelming 
and at those times I am grateful for my forty-mile 
daily commute to and from my home in Oak Park. 
But, contrary to popular belief about what goes on at 
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evangelical schools, I have also found freedom at-
Wheaton to teach what I want in the way I feel best. 
I do not indoctrinate my students, but I want them 
to think seriously about what the Word made flesh 
means to them in their poetry and their fiction. I want 
them to avoid imposing meaning artificially. I want 
them to forget about preconceived Christian "for-
mulae" and write what they see, hear, smell, touch, 
and taste. This is difficult for many Christian students, 
who feel a responsibility to use their talents to the 
glory of God but who have not yet learned that the 
"meaning" is already in them. They do not have to 
plaster it over a poem, or add a neat moral to a story, 
or manipulate characters within a stultifying plot dia-
gram. Students who have embraced the gospel know 
instinctively what transformation means. They under-
stand the thin line between comedy and tragedy. They 
bring with them a knowledge of story from their scrip-
tural studies and this enriches their own efforts im-
measurably. But they still often doubt the power of 
their faith to inform all of their actions-both con-
scious and unconscious. They do not fully believe that 
the image, the character, the metaphor, the story itself 
will contain, without abstraction, the theology. 
This is difficult for us to understand-no matter 
what our faith tradition. We are so afraid that our 
doubts and weaknesses will be revealed-and somehow 
the message both Lutherans and evangelicals have 
given their young people is that to doubt is to commit 
On Second Thought 
From Smithson's ceiling Foucault's pendulum 
unsteadies us who walk in liquid air 
around the steel cable, barely noting 
motion, holding hands in case some fey 
waywardness belies earth's gravity 
and we fall up or down. 
On second thought 
let go. Let's see just what solidifies, 
what sets when what we know veers off, dis-
integrates, remasses on some shore 
we've never seen. 
We wait 
the steady state of our reserve, when our 
true selves around true North converge. 
Martha M. Vertreace 
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the unpardonable sin. We have forgotten Luther's rag-
ing doubts . We have forgotten Christ's doubt as He 
hung on the cross and cried, "Father, why have you 
forsaken me?" We have unwittingly given our fellow 
believers a destructive message: the doubter is the per-
son whose faith will finally die. 
My husband's father, a Missouri Synod pastor, once 
asked in a sermon: "How much faith do you need to 
be a Christian? A mountain's worth? No, all you need 
is a fingertip 's worth." He was not saying that we 
should be content with that fingertip; he was saying 
that God will take us as we are-doubts and all. And 
for all of us who live in the century of doubt, these 
are lifesaving words. 
We make doubt the unpardonable sin. 
We have forgotten Luther's raging 
doubts. We have forgotten Christ's 
doubt as He hung on the cross. We 
have given our fellow believers the 
destructive message that the doubter 
is the person whose faith will die. 
The doubts are sure to come and we need to teach 
our young people how to live with them. What I have 
seen happen to young Christians at both Wheaton and 
at Valparaiso is that, confronted with the truth about 
themselves-that they are doubters, that they have 
been doubters all of their lives, but have up to the 
time of crisis ignored their small everyday doubts or 
attempted to contain them with cliched explanations-
confronted with this truth, they look back on their 
lives, recognize the doubts they have always had, con-
clude they have been living a lie, and throw away their 
faith as a sham. This is the great fai ling of Christian 
education-and perhaps it is the very nature of the 
Christian educational institution that makes this prob-
lem so universal. We have-even at Wheaton, where 
the integration of faith and learning is a living con-
cern-even at Valparaiso, where the chapel is the 
center of the campus-tended to compartmentalize 
our religion. What happens on Saturday night and 
then on Sunday morning seem sometimes to belong to 
two separate categories of experience. In these settings 
the tendency to hold faith up as its own type of good 
work is a grave temptation. 
I hope for my son and daughter, as they watch so 
many of their parochial school friends drift away from 
the faith , that they will also be able to bring forth 
from their Christian education a few "fragments to 
shore up against their ruin." I would like to believe 
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that their parents, their school, and their church have 
helped, not hindered them in this process-that we 
have dealt with them directly and honestly, that we 
have not given them cliches when they have asked 
questions of life and death. 
As for the answer to the question-Who are you 
anyway?-I guess I have to say I am a doubter and a 
believer-and one who is hopeful that the Word made 
flesh can inform my own words and those of my stu-
dents. I am a Lutheran who, much to my surprise, has 
found a place in the evangelical world , and an 
evangelical who communes in the Lutheran church I 
love. I am also, I must confess, one who still stumbles 
at the evangelical version of "A Mighty Fortress." Did 
you know "theirs" was different both in text and set-
ting? Don't tell my Wheaton colleagues, but I sure like 
"our" version better. Cl 
Travelling by Night 
The full moon hangs in a spring sky 
Loose above the road I travel 
In the shadow of the hills 
Of water, sand, and snow. 
I remember streams and fish. 
The moon in its Four Phases 
Hangs on a calendar nailed to my wall, 
Where each day's fish lies in the belly of the moon, 
Symbols to indicate prime time 
For dying on my angler's hook 
In swift and never-failing streams. 
I sleep and travel deep into the night. 
Across the Darkest Phases of the moon 
I see a man sink in the belly of a fish 
Dying for three days in its watery flesh. 
Fish rises from the murk of the abyss 
And spews its blessed water 
On craters of the earth. 
I dream the dying of the moon, 
See symbols on my calendar 
Turn into hanging fish, celestial catch, 
An ICHTHYS in the lightening heavens 
Above my darkened road . 
Charlotte F. Otten 
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Linda C. Ferguson 
MUSIC AS A LIBERAL ART 
Reflections on Music Education 
Were music taught today in the terms of the 
medieval quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry, 
and astronomy), it would be, as a subject, unrecogniz-
able to most liberal arts students as well as to most 
musicians. The liberal study of music, the science of 
relative multitudes, dealt with the nature of the 
phenomenon rather than its particularized manifesta-
tions: that which was speculated upon rather than 
heard. 1 
Is it possible that music as traditionally understood 
among the quadrivial sciences is something completely 
other than music as it figures in contemporary cul-
ture? It would seem so; and yet vestiges of the liberal 
understanding of music linger in everyday life. The 
liberal tradition, as distinct from the practical or pro-
fessional tradition, suggests that music, as a discipline 
and human endeavor, must be dealt with in a serious 
way. The liberal tradition is responsible for our view 
that making music is distinguished from utilitarian 
handicrafts such as quilting and carpentry, and from 
recreational and athletic skills such as gymnastics and 
swimming. The liberal tradition is responsible for the 
inclusion of music courses and degrees in academia, 
for the generally accepted opinion that it is good for 
children to take piano lessons, for the recurrent belief 
that certain forms of popular music are detrimental to 
the moral fibre of the young, and for the common 
practice of employing music in worship and on solemn 
public occasions. Most educated (and many un-educated) 
persons operate on the assumption that music is a 
"good," whether or not they claim to understand any-
thing about it. This assumption, too, is grounded in 
liberal thinking. In these and other common practices 
and assumptions, we affirm Plato's belief that human-
kind is endowed by the Muses with harmony, not only 
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"with a view to irrational pleasure,"2 but for some-
higher purpose as well, within the realm of intelligibil-
ity and towards some end that ultimately relates to 
goodness. 
But do these vestiges represent a coherent and inte-
grated understanding of music in the life of the mind 
and spirit, or are they merely left-over empty customs 
which will be discarded as soon as they are consciously 
examined? I propose that there is still a connection be-
tween music as a liberal art and music as a fine art 
which can find practical application in education. And 
I will hypothesize that a key to understanding the 
relationship between music as it is speculated upon 
and music as it is heard can be found through 
considering the connection between the musical 
composition and the musical performance. It 
should be emphasized that I am not claiming that mu-
sical composition is a liberal art while musical perform-
ance is a fine art. Rather, I suggest that music's dual 
nature in education bears analogy to the relationship 
between the musical composition and the musical per-
formance. This basic problem of musical aesthetics can 
help define and illuminate the nature of music's split 
personality. 
In an essay which appeared earlier in these pages 
("The LP Generation and Me," September, 1984), I 
observed that any serious effort to determine music's 
essential nature is almost immediately beset with the 
necessity of some attention to the distinctive processes 
and products of the composer and of the performer. 
I would claim, further, that the composer-performer 
tension has been especially problematic for those aes-
theticians who are eager to make all arts fulfill the 
same conditions. The simple process/product account-
1Justification for the inclusion of music in the traditional system 
of liberal arts, as well as the rationales supporting variant po-
sitionings of music among the quadrivial sciences, is discussed 
by Edward A. Lippman, "The Place of Music in the System of 
Liberal Arts," in Aspects of Medieval and Renaissance Music: A 
Birthday Offering to Gustav Reese, ed. LaRue (New York: Norton, 
1966), pp. 545-559. 
2Piato Timaeus (trans. Jowett) 47d. 
21 
ing will not dismiss the duality, since, to condense the 
argument from the earlier essay, both composer and 
performer can claim to be artists, each engaging in a 
process which results in a product: the product of the 
composer being purely conceptual, in contrast to the 
audible product of the performer. 
Let us accept as useful Leonard Meyer's explanation 
that a performance at once "actualizes and par-
ticularizes the potential information contained in the 
score."3 And let us further accept Hilde Hein's defini-
tion of performance as "an aesthetic phenomenon of 
primary [not merely secondary, or derivative] signifi-
cance," characterized by dynamism and process, with 
change (or "becoming") as its fundamental value.4 
To study music liberally is to aspire 
to accomplishment beyond technical 
proficiency or mastery of specialized 
information. Liberality entails 
reflection; it encourages the ability 
not only to do but to think clearly 
about what one does and why. 
Edward Lippman defines the musical composition, 
on the other hand, as "a nonaudible entity that exists 
only as an object of intention," and, further, that "on-
tologically the musical work is a conceptual object; it 
is not an aesthetic object in a literal sense but in the 
extended sense of its meaning and implication, its as-
sociated imagery and sonorous realization. The work is 
quite distinct from any of its performances and from 
the totality of them."5 Let us adopt Lippman's defini-
tion of the musical work as conceptual object and let 
it serve to represent the abstract and general concept, 
"Music." The conceptual existence of Music (as distinct 
from "works of music") can be understood as analo-
gous to the ontological status of the composition. And 
as the composition is "quite distinct from any of its 
performances -and from the totality of them," so is 
"Music," in the abstract and liberal sense, distinct from 
any of its works and "from the totality of them." 
Again, to extend the argument begun in my essay 
on recorded music, cited earlier, we must recognize 
that the composition's existence transcends both 
printed score and audible performance. It is not "used 
3Leonard Meyer, "On Re-hearing Music," in Music, the Arts, and 
Ideas (University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 48. 
4 Hilde Hein, "Performance as an Aesthetic Category," journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (1970) : 382, 384. 
5 Edward A. Lippman, A Humanistic Philosophy of Music (New 
York University Press, 1977), pp. 49, 238-39 . 
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up" by repeated realizations, not consumed by "defini-
tive performances" nor deteriorated by inept ones. 
Performances particularize and concretize the abstract 
ideal of the composition, as works of music par-
ticularize and make sensible the ideal of Music. In the 
relationship between composition and performance, 
then, lies a key for maintaining music's liberal and 
general integrity, while allowing us to ground our 
study of it in sound. 
To study music liberally is to aspire to accomplish-
ment beyond technical proficiency or mastery of spe-
cialized information. Liberality entails reflection and 
self-consciousness; it encourages the ability not only to 
do but to think clearly about what one does and why 
one does it. In purely sonic phenomena, the liberal 
tradition dictates that, ultimately, we seek meaning. 
But proposing to students that we study music liberally 
by contemplating meaning is an invitation to contrive 
fanciful literary and pictorial images. And while there 
is nothing necessarily wrong with such constructions, 
too often they allow the student to delude himself into 
believing that his inventions truly explain the content 
of the musical work which allegedly provoked them. 
Something has gone awry. 
To understand music in the liberal sense is to reflect 
upon its meaning, upon the kinds of meanings it can 
reasonably be claimed to carry, upon its connections 
with other human expressions and endeavors, upon its 
relationship to ideas larger han its own systems. In 
short, the liberal study of music must be conducted in 
the terms of philosophy rather than of a diluted 
musicology. And the terms of philosophy seem far re-
moved from students who obligingly concoct 
screenplays to accompany the "soundtracks" of Mozart 
and Brahms symphonies they are assigned to hear. In 
trying to move from music as a liberal discipline to 
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music as a sonorous experience, we have neglected, in 
our collective thinking and in our teaching, to distin-
guish between Music (as philosophy construes it) and 
works of music (as they are manifest in musical prac-
tice). Similarly, we are frequently careless in failing to 
distinguish between the separate processes and prod-
ucts of composer and performer, when we speak am-
biguously of "music" and of "musicians." 
In order to be true to our liberal inclinations, begin-
nings must follow from the idea of Music as a general 
phenomenon of which works of music are concrete 
particularizations. To do so will result in more defen-
sible conjectures about musical meaning. In order to 
discover the specific significance of particular works of 
music, we might seek to discern how that work is dis-
tinct from others of its kind. But to establish categories 
of meaning, we must seek the essence which all works 
of music share. The liberal study of music, then, be-
gins with an inquiry into the nature of music, and it 
continues with the "why" rather than the "how." 
But music as experienced is not abstract and 
speculative. Rather it is concrete and particular, even 
that music we conventionally call abstract. The study 
of "Music" can proceed only for a very short time 
without reference to musical examples, to concrete 
music sounds (i.e. "works of music") . And so, in mod-
ern times, a well-justified shift in emphasis from the 
abstract to the sonorous experience of music has re-
sulted in courses for the lay person known loosely as 
"general music" and taught by specialists in musical 
practice. True generality, however, has given way to a 
highly fragmented set of approaches to musical ap-
preciation. Analyses, provision of socio-historical back-
ground, biographical study of composers, concern for 
identification of stylistic periods and specific works, 
and emphasis on score-reading have, for purposes of 
these courses, become the apparent means to musical 
comprehension. Works of music are treated, often in 
detail, but Music (as an abstraction) is rarely consid-
ered, if at all, and usually only to expedite some prac-
tical explanation of rudiments (e.g., how quarter notes 
relate to whole notes). 
By compartmentalizing the study of music, even for 
the non-musician, into the categories of history, formal 
and stylistic analysis, ethnic derivation, and social con-
text, the relationship between music as we hear it and 
music as our liberal tradition tells us it is becomes in-
creasingly unclear. I am not suggesting that such 
categories be disregarded. The problem does not lie in 
specialized studies of music, which may serve their 
own good purposes, but rather in the delusion which 
they promote that knowledge of the beautiful and 
meaningful in music comes through the study of any 
one fragment. To fragment Music is to explain it, on 
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the one hand, as the Pythagoreans did: by claiming 
that the mathematical ratios between tones are identi-
cal with the basic reality. On the other hand, we di-
minish not only the value of Music, but ourselves as 
well, if we deny it the rational and intelligible dimen-
sion. 
Rarely do students in music 
departments confront the basic 
philosophical issues: What is the 
nature of musical art? What is 
"created"? What are the principles 
of creation in this art? What are 
its limits, and its possibilities? 
The general and abstract principles which underlie 
Music and which unify all works of music have not, as 
a rule, been the starting point for "General Music" 
education; rather, attention has been diverted im-
mediately to very particular aspects of particular com-
positions-and from the musical sounds to the histor-
ical and cultural baggage introduced as "music ap-
preciation." Concern for Music as a liberal art, I have 
claimed, results in a study organized in the terms of 
aesthetics. But aesthetic inquiry, in academic institu-
tions, usually resides in philosophy departments; 
courses in introductory aesthetics are rarely taught by 
professors with any rigorous understanding of the 
inner working of musical objects, and they fai l too 
often to take into account the autonomy of musical 
art. "If we start by postulating the essential sameness 
of the arts," writes Langer, "we shall learn no more 
about that sameness. We shall only skip or evade every 
problem that seems, offhand, to pertain to one art but 
not to some other, because it cannot be really a prob-
lem of Art, and so we shall forcibly limit ourselves to 
simple generalities that may be safely asserted."6 
Music departments, on the other hand, offer courses 
taught by musicians and musicologists which aim at 
mastery, either practical or theoretical, of particular 
objects of musical art. Rarely do students in music de-
partments confront the basic philosophical issues: 
What is the nature of musical art? What is "created"? 
What are the principles of creation in this art? What 
are its limits, and its possibilities? The lack of apparent 
connection between music as liberal art and music as 
practiced is reinforced, if not caused, by the failure of 
philosophers and musicians to refer to one another. It 
6Susanne K. Langer, "Deceptive Analogies," in Problems of Art 
(New York: Scribner's, 1957), p. 78. 
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should be obvious that aestheticians need practitioners 
of music in order to be supplied with the objects for 
their speculations. It has generally been less obvious 
that a reciprocal need exists, but I suggest that musi-
cians and music educators do need the work of 
philosophers if they are to comprehend the signifi-
cance of their own work in the larger world of ideas. 
How should a truly "general" music 
education proceed? It should begin 
with the abstractions of the 
philosopher, with the what and why of 
music, with large questions of value. 
How then, should a truly "general" music education 
proceed? It should begin with the abstractions of the 
philosopher, with the what and the why of Music, with 
the large questions of value and meaning. From these 
speculative beginnings, the study should move to the 
testing ground of sonorous music (i.e., works of 
music). Recall the analogy constructed earlier, and 
consider that compositions precede performances of 
those compositions. Something must be understood 
about the work before it makes sense to comment on 
particular realizations of that work. Similarly, some-
thing general must be understood about Music as an 
abstraction before claims about particular works of 
music can be valid. But compositions left unperformed 
remain virtually unknowable by the layperson. So, 
Music contemplated only philosophically, m the 
abstract and general sense, is ungraspable. 
"General Music," like the composition, is inaudible, 
an ideal object of conception and intention, rather 
than of concrete embodiment; recognition of its exis-
tence makes possible an infinite number of concrete 
manifestations (which are dynamic and graspable) and 
also unifies and brings coherence to an otherwise un-
manageable body of human expressions. Like the mu-
sical composition, Music, in the liberal sense, must be 
particularized in practice if it is to be experienced, but 
it cannot be totally contained or defined in any one 
embodiment. But as multiple hearings of a single per-
formance of a composition can reveal the nature of 
that composition to an ever more informed listener (as 
through repeated hearings of a recorded perform-
ance), so can a single work of music provide the lis-
tener with greater understanding of what Music is . 
And as multiple performances can ever reveal new di-
mensions and potentialities inherent in a single com-
position, so can the possibilities of Music be suggested, 
but never exhausted, by works of music. Cl 
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Country W inter 
though I am gone 
I remember how silently leaves 
fall in the deep woods 
and how the crows sweep 
darkly over the hard trees 
against the blood sun of autumn 
there will be a soft time 
of dim light 
and obscure dreams 
while last stalks from corn rows 
send up their rose smoke 
then 
knowing the year's end 
marks their own 
the people stop on their walks 
to listen in the silver moonlight 
and stare down frozen rutted lanes 
to bright windows through tangled 
branches along the creek 
and in a neighboring town 
a woman will turn 
to the window 
rather than speak the words 
in the cold rooms 
for now they will not speak 
of the aching 
or the pull of the ground 
that draws them down into the earth 
to meet something there 
half-way 
to help it up 
that will be later: 
some sense of turning-
an awakening 
J. T. Ledbetter 
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Labor Day Labor 
Richard Lee 
The Labor Day sermon came 
down in the suburban church I vis-
ited, and the preacher called us all 
to greater faithfulness at our work. 
Most of the familiar ingredients for 
such a sermon were present or ac-
counted for--our work at our jobs 
was our "calling from God"; our 
work at our jobs participated in His 
"order of creation"; our work at our 
jobs should therefore be done "hon-
estly for honest pay," and finally, by 
His grace, the quality of our work 
could go "beyond price" and become 
our "pardonable pride." In my hear-
ing no one wept or laughed. 
The preacher meant well, of 
course. But once again The Ancient 
of Days was silly puttied into the 
shape of a job placement director, 
drill sergeant, and pom-pom girl for 
the celebration of work. The sermon 
almost turned work into very Provi-
dence, but an early "Amen," possibly 
due to the heat of the day, pulled it 
up short of that popular protestant 
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I don't want to belabor the ear-
nest preacher's sermon. To preach 
on work is to tackle a formidable 
task of biblical interpretation, and 
I'd rather my preacher try and fal-
ter than not try at all. The biblical 
view of work is surely tricky--our 
work may be blessing or curse; our 
work takes its limit but also its be-
ginning in sabbath; our work al-
most accidentally provides for our-
selves while it takes its nearer pur-
pose in relieving the poor; Jesus 
perhaps carpenters but mostly wan-
ders itinerantly dependent upon 
the work of others, while Paul 
boasts that his work of the ministry 
is supported by his tentmaking. 
And behind all the biblical images 
of work from the first Adam to the 
last Archangel is "The God Who 
Works" almightily in all His crea-
tion and redemption for us. 
As nettlesome as it must be for 
preachers to clear the ground 
around the biblical view of work, it 
is reasonably clear it has little to do 
with that Labor Day sermon. To 
begin with, the biblical focus is on 
the worker not the work. God's 
callings to men and women in the 
Bible are almost always away from 
their work before they are re-
turned to it, and I suspect His sev-
eral callings for us today must first 
distance us from our jobs. No better 
word of God could now be heard 
in America where the pressures 
mount daily to subordinate all of 
our lives to our jobs and serve the 
national god of productivity. Cer-
tainly biblical preaching need not 
echo that work ethic nor claim it 
for God until it is cleansed of its 
ideology. If the suburban preacher 
had looked into his congregation 
he might have seen many men and 
women-including a nearing 
majority of two-income families-
already overdetermined by their 
jobs. He might also have noted 
some unemployed for whom his 
sermon had nothing to say until 
they found work. 
The biblical view of our callings 
from God is always broader than 
our jobs, even broader than our 
work outside our jobs, and it is 
closely related to the calling of the 
Gospel. (A theologian might say 
that our work is as much a part of 
God's "order of redemption" as it is 
part of His "order of creation.") 
This means that our callings first 
distance us from our work in order 
to return us to our work to deter-
mine it-rather than let it deter-
mme us. 
What that determination of our 
work means concretely for each job 
each layman preaches best to him-
self or herself, and there is no bib-
lical blueprint for the reformation 
of all the conditions of human 
labor. In that suburban church, 
however, some of the members 
held the more privileged jobs in 
our society, and I suspect they 
would know where to reform their 
professions-and possibly the con-
ditions of the work of the workers 
they manage. A Labor Day sermon 
relieving the faithful but fretful 
from their subjection of themselves 
to their work (of subjecting others 
to their work) might have been wel-
come to some of the weary and 
heavy laden in that congregation. 
But that good news depends upon 
preaching the God who brings all 
things into subjection to Himself 
and would have all men and 
women bring their work into sub-
jection to themselves. 
Which brings me back to the ser-
mon I promised not to belabor. 
Perhaps faithfulness at the work of 
at least one congregation might 
begin by helping its preacher dis-
tance himself from his work to de-
termine his work afresh. All our 
callings from God begin by putting 
His care for the worker before the 
worker's carefulness for his work, 
and that seems to me good news 
for both preacher and people any 
Labor Day. Cl 
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A Successful 
Return to Oz 
Richard Maxwell 
The new Walt Disney production 
Return to Oz is not drawn exclu-
sively from any one of L. Frank 
Baum's stories. The scriptwriters 
have combined elements from The 
Land of Oz, Ozma of Oz, and proba-
bly The Emerald City of Oz. This syn-
thetic approach makes sense. The 
Land is often considered Baum's 
best book but it contains several 
prominent elements which would 
not play well in 1985: the elaborate 
satire on feminism is dated (though 
it is exciting when General Jinjur 
and her army of housewives with 
knitting needles conquer the 
Emerald City); Tip's sex-change 
operation into Princess Ozma 
would probably seem kinky to pres-
ent-day audiences, whether chil-
dren or adults. While the movie re-
tains much of The Land's plot, char-
acters from Ozma (Billina the chick-
en, Tik-Tok the robot) and the 
threat against Oz itself in The 
Emerald City fill in what would 
otherwise be considerable gaps. 
This material yields marvelous 
set-pieces. In one sequence, 
Dorothy must steal a magic powder 
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from a kind of museum gallery 
where a sorceress, the Princess 
Mombi, displays her spare heads 
(culled from beautiful women). 
The heads nod on their pedestals 
in velvet cases while Dorothy tip-
toes past; she reaches a case 
fronted with a mirror and opening 
it furtively finds herself facing the 
sorceress's original head, spiteful 
and restless in its slumbers perhaps 
because it has been tossed in this 
dark corner. As Dorothy grabs the 
powder the head awakens and 
screams her name at her-and then 
the other heads open their eyes 
and follow suit, and then we see 
(upstairs) Mombi's headless body 
rise from its bed, shaking with rage 
or fear , it is hard to say which. 
There is much more to praise: 
the bowlegged walk of Tik-Tok, 
perfectly matching his rotund mor-
phology; the midwestern voice of 
Billina, who sounds like a Hoosier 
aunt of mine (and no doubt like 
other people's Hoosier aunts); the 
good grace of Dorothy, a young ac-
tress quite different from Judy 
Garland. So many scenes and de-
tails come out well that eventually 
the Ozophile viewer becomes a bit 
puzzled . Return to Oz has been cob-
bled together with great compe-
tence-but how can it sustain itself 
so consistently? A film that was 
merely professional wouldn't have 
this magic. Somehow a whole has 
been made from these diverse 
parts. 
The film's energy comes from a 
positive respect for Baum. There is 
also a negative energy at work. No 
one could set out to make an Oz 
movie and ignore MGM's 1939 
spectacular. In certain ways Return 
seems to evade the obvious prece-
dent. It offers no songs and the 
characters resemble John Neill's il-
lustrations to the original stories 
more than they do Ray Bolger and 
company in vaudeville getup. 
Nonetheless the second feature-
length Oz movie comments im-
plicitly and extensively on the 
first.The commentary is worth 
study as a skirmish in the history of 
film; also (and more importantly) 
because it is a means by which the 
later work keeps its imaginative in-
tegrity. 
Since any real American has seen 
The Wizard of Oz at least three 
times, I need hardly explain the 
trick of plot whereby the black-and-
white Kansas characters reappear 
as technicolor Oz characters. This 
device was invented by Noel 
Langley, who wrote four early 
drafts of The Wizard. Later, after 
Langley had been dismissed from 
the project, a new pair of 
scriptwriters developed his idea in 
a way that he had not anticipated. 1 
Oz is a dream version of Kansas? 
All right, then. Dorothy's overrid-
ing desire throughout her Oz ad-
ventures will be to get back to Kan-
sas. She will learn from her adven-
tures in a transfigured version of 
that no doubt excellent state that 
home is a wonderful place, replete 
with marvels and full of love she 
had previously overlooked. And 
just in case anybody misses the 
point, Glinda will prompt our 
heroine to state outright her 
philosophy of home, immediately 
before she returns to Auntie Em 
and immediately after too. 
The last moments of this se-
quence are especially noteworthy. 
Dorothy wakes up in bed with a 
nasty crack on the head and all the 
friendly characters of her dream 
gathered about her, now in their 
Kansas personae. (What about the 
witch, bad Margaret Hamilton? Has 
1The story of the scripts, so far as it will 
ever be known, is set forth in Aljean 
Harmetz's The Making of the Wizard of Oz 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp . 
26-59. In Baum's books-where the 
dream framework is unthought of-
Dorothy is able to convince her family 
that Oz exists; eventually she invites 
them to move there and they do. Baum 
is so matter-of-fact about the whole thing 
that the concept of doubled worlds never 
becomes a dominating concern. 
The Cresset 
she given up her plan to extermi-
nate Toto? Was she blown away by 
the storm? We will never find out.) 
As the strains of "There's No Place 
Like Home" fade out gently, the 
following dialogue ensues. Dorothy: 
Oh, Auntie Em, it's you! Auntie Em: 
There there, lie quiet now, you've 
just had a bad dream. Dorothy: No, 
it wasn't a dream. This was a real 
truly-live-place-and I remember 
that some of it wasn't very nice. 
But most of it was beautiful. But 
just the same all I kept saying to 
everybody was, "I want to go 
home"-and they sent me home. 
(Nervous laughter from her assembled 
auditors.) Doesn't anybody believe 
me? But anyway, Toto, we're 
home, home-and this is my room 
and you're all here and I'm not 
going to leave here ever again be-
cause I love you all and-oh , 
Auntie Em, there's no place like 
home!"2 
To quote Yip Harburg (lyricist 
for The Wizard and yet another 
tinkerer with its script): "The pic-
ture didn't need that 'Home, Sweet 
Home,' 'God Bless Our Home' 
tripe."3 I agree with Harburg-and 
yet, the offending sequence has its 
merits. Its combination of cloying 
sweetness with near-hysteria has no 
serious rival, unless in the Christ-
mas stories of Charles Dickens. 
Something urgent is being com-
municated here, though the 
medium is less the words than it is 
the histrionics of Judy Garland. 
This Dorothy is eager but unable to 
convey the reality of her experi-
ence. No one will ever believe her, 
a fact she appears to realize al-
ready. She is doomed to a life with 
people who love her and humor 
her. They will always tap their 
heads a little when Dorothy starts 
talking about Oz. What then can 
21 quote from a phonograph record 
which gives an abridged version of the 
dialogue, so there may be some lines 
missing here. 
3 Harmetz, p. 57 
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our unfortunate heroine do but 
blather on about staying home 
forever with Auntie Em? 
Return to Oz begins with another 
prelude in Kansas, this time a more 
elaborate one. Uncle Henry can't 
seem to get the house rebuilt, even 
though winter is rapidly coming 
on, and Dorothy keeps babbling 
about scarecrows. Auntie Em is fed 
up with them both. She takes the 
little girl to a neighboring town for 
a course of electroshock therapy 
guaranteed to eliminate Oz from 
Dorothy's mind. While the doctor 
makes his pitch, Dorothy spots 
another little girl, more convention-
ally pretty than she, who pops up 
behind a window and then disap-
pears. Later the same girl helps 
Dorothy escape just before the 
shock treatment is to begin. They 
rush out into a bad storm, followed 
by the horrible Nurse Wilson. 
Dorothy's new friend drowns (it is 
implied) in a swollen river while 
Dorothy herself manages to sail 
downstream in a chicken coop. She 
wakes up the next morning 
stranded on the edge of Oz with a 
miraculously articulate Billina. 
Home is not a comfort-
able place, despite the 
pieties of MGM. 
None of this is very light-
hearted. There is an edge of 
whimsy in some of the proceedings 
(e.g. , Dorothy soliloquizing to Bil-
lina in the farmyard , shortly before 
she is taken off to the doctor) but 
the comic tonality of The Wizard's 
prelude is replaced by a pervasive 
melancholy. Home is not a com-
fortable place, despite the pieties of 
MGM. Kansas and Oz are not so 
much parallel as they are antitheti-
cal worlds. To put the point 
another way, Dorothy has to choose 
one or the other but can't have 
both without everybody coming 
down on her. The problem is un-
derlined by the absence of Ray 
Bolger, Frank Haley, and Bert 
Lahr-that is, of the characters 
who lived on the farm but also had 
Oz identities. Not one of these dou-
bled characters has reappeared so 
far in The Return. And even though 
the crackpot doctor may remind us 
of Frank Morgan/Professor Marvel, 
his function is to suppress imagina-
tion, not stimulate it. If home once 
had some Ozish elements, it doesn't 
anymore. 
The Wizard is about Dorothy's re-
turn to Kansas (so, at least, its con-
cluding scene insists); the new film 
is about her Return to Oz and her 
subsequent attempt to restore that 
elusive kingdom before she must 
leave it once again. As Dorothy 
soon discovers, Oz has fallen to a 
mysterious enemy. The Yellow 
Brick Road looks like the Dan Ryan 
expressway after a hard winter-
except that there's no one to be vic-
timized by the potholes. The 
Emerald City is in ruins, and all of 
Dorothy's companions have become 
statues. The petrified city recalls an 
unusually perverse Mannerist gar-
den. Signs of life are frozen and 
distanced: the only "living" crea-
tures are mechanical or semi-
mechanical (the friendly Tik-Tok, 
the hostile Wheelers). The con-
queror of Oz is the Gnome King, a 
monarch of the subterranean min-
eral world who doubles for the 
crackpot doctor. The king and the 
doctor have in common an ability 
to preserve the form but eliminate 
the motivating principle of life. 
The Gnome King's assistant in this 
endeavor is the above-mentioned 
Princess Mombi, a double for 
Nurse Wilson; if he assimilates ev-
erything to his own stony sub-
stance, she has her own methods 
for turning other people into her-
self. 
Dorothy has to risk becoming an 
ornament of the Gnome King or a 
head of the Princess Mombi; she 
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triumphs over both these compul-
sive collectors by using the Powder 
of Life, which animates the inani-
mate, and by respecting the inde-
pendent existence of characters 
created to be servants or slaves 
(Jack Pumpkinhead, Tik-Tok). Her 
adventures survived, she can locate 
the Princess Ozma, who has been 
under an enchantment. Ozma 
turns out to be the girl who 
drowned in the river at the film's 
beginning. Ozma is a doubled char-
acter, one of whose incarnations is 
cut off by death. Her fate is not 
exactly like going to Heaven. She 
has had her existence in two realms 
all along, neither of them especially 
other-worldly. She continues to live 
in Oz while ceasing to exist in Kan-
sas. She becomes-as the film 
makes clear by its use of mirrors 
and of visual compositions-the Oz 
side of Dorothy Gale herself. 
The last scene of Return expands 
on Dorothy's relation with Ozma. 
She can see the Princess in her 
bedroom mirror (the house has 
been completed by Uncle Henry, 
who came out of his funk for 
reasons not explained). Our 
heroine smiles at the image of 
Ozma-but does so privately. Like 
Mombi, she has come to live her 
most intense imaginative life alone, 
in front of a mirror and trying on 
new heads. Dorothy, of course, 
came by her fantasy world hon-
estly-and through that other ver-
sion of self in the mirror she has 
access (or believes she does) to a 
world independent of her. She 
treats the mirror as a window 
rather than as a reflection. This 
distinction is perilously subtle, how-
ever. We are asked to agree that 
something resembling narciSSism 
and terminal subjectivity is really 
nothing of the sort. 
Dorothy's predicament will con-
tinue to seem pitiable until we re-
call the end of The Wizard. The 
new Dorothy has at least learned 
when to keep her mouth shut. She 
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cannot commit herself wholeheart-
edly to Kansas, she makes no 
promises to stay there forever, but 
neither does she stop functioning 
in her everyday world. If she has to 
walk a tightrope, so be it. The di-
verse materials of Baum's Oz cycle 
and doubling gimmicks borrowed 
from MGM's Wizard have thus been 
newly interpreted: assimilated to a 
story which replaces one 
philosophy of home with another. 
Not quite a dream but not a so-
cially shareable reality either, Oz 
has become the means by which 
one heroine draws back a little-by 
which she avoids the return to 
emotional infancy forced on that 
other Dorothy Gale of the movies. 
New Praises 
Now that the river's flow and mountain's form, 
the shade of sky and bend of branches giving warning 
can be Rearranged 
the infidel is obsolete. 
And spirit gods. And frenzied red epiphanies. 
Filed like heathen clothed-along with 
voodoo drum and sacrificial knife-
under Those Imperfect Times. 
Now that Man takes on dominionship without weight of 
satan masks or dog teeth chains, 
turns water into More 
without imploring gods of thunder, sun, or (to be sure 
of overlapping) anything, 
makes from even excrement 
antidotes his forebears only shrieked about, 
sees through Divine, controls Creation, plumbs all 
secrets without quaking, 
guesswork's past. Terror's done. 
Nothing stands Man can't work Over. 
Harnessed now all ancient fickleness the painted savage 
chased with panic-dancing. 
Doused the superstitious pagan fires. 
Every heretic has been converted. Therefore: 
Praise we now the beep-buzz-hum reviling 
full moon chant and tomtom thump. 
Praise we, spirit-freed, the bloodless Good 





Ruins and the 
Fate of Nations 
Gail McGrew Eifrig 
I have just returned from a short 
trip to England. The Editor said 
that a deadline just a few days after 
my return would be just dandy be-
cause I would have lots to say 
about two cultures. Oddly enough, 
he was right. The difference be-
tween old and new became very 
strongly lodged in my thoughts; 
while there, I saw hundreds of 
ruins, and back in Valparaiso, I 
found the vicinity of my office in 
an uproar of construction for the 
new law school. If that juxtaposi-
tion doesn't set some ideas in mo-
tion , you can't possibly be a column 
writer. 
The Old World certainly is old. 
Obviously, England also lives and 
thrives in the present, probably 
moving as rapidly into the future 
as any of its European counter-
parts. But it is nonetheless true that 
the past is a dominant feature of 
English life, just as stately homes, 
cathedrals, and castles dominate a 
good many views and skylines in 
the landscape. Collections of old 
things draw gasps of wonder from 
the tourist from another era; is that 
Gail McGrew Eifri~ teaches English 
at Valparaiso University and writes reg-
ularly about public affairs for The 
Cresset. 
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really Jane Austen's bonnet? the 
Duke of Wellington's sword? 
Queen Elizabeth the First's glove? 
Did Charles touch this very doorsill 
as he stepped out to the scaffold? 
No kidding-the Magna Carta? St. 
Cuthbert's coffin? a Saxon arch? 
Walking along the Roman wall, the 
Hadrian's wall, nudging the sheep 
and battling the misty drench, it 
isn't that hard to imagine the 
Roman legionary looking out over 
the same damp landscape wonder-
ing if some Pict would dare to 
come over the top of the outer 
ditch. 
The stately homes themselves are 
mausoleums of the great age of 
European civilization; in endless 
marble halls are innumerable ob-
jects of glass, china, furniture, 
painting, and sculpture gathered in 
from the past-protected, restored, 
refurbished, renovated, dusted, 
catalogued. There is so much of it, 
so many miles of those hallways, so 
many tombs, so many ruins. They 
must be good for something; they 
must have some lesson. 
It may be that, like the enigmatic 
message of Keats' urn, they simply 
say that "Beauty is all ye know on 
earth, and all ye need to know." 
The exercise of human skill and in-
genuity in the production of all 
these artifacts is immense, from the 
delicate carving of Grinling Gib-
bons in oak panelled rooms to the 
careful joining of stone and mortar 
in the walls of Kenilworth Castle. 
Beauty really matters there. In Eng-
land one is continually confronted 
with what is beautiful, in golden 
villages splashed with roses, in 
stained glass windows, in magnifi-
cent copper beeches planted at 
exactly the right place to contrast 
with the morning sun on a green 
lawn. Furthermore, the beauty 
created in the past is lovingly and 
skillfully maintained in the present; 
that lawn has been tended and 
rolled this week, as well as for the 
past three hundred years. Hearing 
the choir at King's College sing a 
Mass by William Byrd is to be in 
the presence of an experience of 
beauty both past and present. It is 
also to be made aware that one is, 
ineluctably, an American. 
Though the American landscape 
is one of great beauty, we are also 
surrounded by vast areas of ugli-
ness. And though as a people we 
profess some slight interest in the 
past, it is the present and the fu-
ture with which we are most con-
stantly in touch. Watch This Site. 
The drive from O'Hare Field to 
northwest Indiana on a muggy Au-
gust afternoon must be one of the 
world's least scenic. Filled with 
wrecks of old warehouses not yet 
entirely dismantled, pieces of out-
worn machinery, abandoned 
houses, remnants of disused high-
ways, billboards with half-mes-
sages-the entire landscape ought 
to look as though people had 
finished with it. Instead, there is 
about the whole thing something 
potential, something that asks to be 
looked at next week. 
Though the American 
landscape is one of great 
beauty, we are also 
surrounded by vast 
areas of ugliness. 
Watch This Site. Whoever put up 
that hopeful drive-in hamburger 
stand has long gone, and he had 
time to board up only some of its 
windows. Did he leave because he 
opened a bigger restaurant? (Now 
Under New Management!) Or did 
he go into the aluminum siding 
business? Or has he moved to 
Houston where he runs a carwash 
franchise with his brother-in-law? 
Or has he gone no one knows 
where as his wife and kids struggle 
to make it on welfare? It isn't beau-
tiful, and it shows little sign that 
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anybody cares what it will look like 
tomorrow, but is the meaning of 
the American urban landscape all 
bad? 
The fact that the previous state-
ment is put as a question is impor-
tant. America, notwithstanding its 
bicentennial, is very new. And it is 
still very much a question. Lincoln 
knew that when he said that his 
own age was "testing whether this 
nation, or any nation so conceived 
and so dedicated , can long en-
dure." Its sense of potentiality is es-
sential, and accounts for what fasci-
nates Europeans about America. 
We could do almost anything to-
morrow, and there's no really good 
way of predicting what that might 
be, which is why the Englishman, at 
least, watches America with in-
terest, amusement, and an eye on 
the door. 
Picture the scene in the Western, 
where the unknown cowboy comes 
into town shouting and waving his 
gun around, ready to spend money 
and make a big impression. Is he 
drunk? is he angry? has he just 
struck gold? will he hug the lady 
on the board sidewalk, or will he 
pick her up to use as a hostage 
when he heads over to rob the 
bank? The town dwellers have a 
phrase, a peculiarly American 
phrase, for this oddball, this wild 
card, this loose cannon; they refer 
to him as "trigger happy." He 
could shoot everybody in sight, or 
he could buy everybody in town a 
drink, marry the schoolteacher, 
and save the new church from 
being burnt down by the outlaw 
gang. But who can tell until he has 
done it? 
Like the unknown cowboy, 
America is more readily defined by 
its future than by its past. Not-
withstanding Reagan and com-
pany's speechmaking, there is no 
going back to a "golden age" in 
which America's true essence stood 
pure and undefiled. Seeking for 
that America is the most pointless 
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task since Coronado wasted all his 
resources roaming around the 
Southwest looking for the Seven 
Cities of Gold. America's essence, 
which becomes clearer when we 
look back at ourselves from across 
the sea, is the future . If we are a 
great nation, it will be because of 
the way we meet tomorrow, not be-
cause of what we have done in the 
past. More critical even than our 
dealings with the USSR will be our 
dealings with the Third World, 
with the unknowns brought about 
by the rise of powerful new entities 
not dreamt of in nineteenth-cen-
tury or early twentieth-century 
schemes of diplomacy and interna-
tional affairs. 
It is more pleasant to think of 
ourselves in terms of the past, and 
in terms of our relationship to our 
European heritage, because we 
then look rather grand. As one of 
the heads of state of the "modern 
powers," our President looks well in 
the group pictures with Thatcher, 
Mitterand, Kohl, and company. But 
those pictures of the group at Will-
iamsburg last summer were revela-
tory and disturbing. The heads of 
state of the old world looked as 
sharp and trim as the buildings of 
the restored town around them, 
but that setting is a museum. No 
one lives there. When our chief of 
state really represents the Ameri-
can presence in the world, it will 
have to be in some place other than 
Rockefeller's lovely version of 
American history. What do we look 
like in the context of South Africa's 
restless mobs? or Brazil's ravaged 
economy? or Palestine's bombed 
camps? 
A wonderful English stgn, 
perhaps apocryphal, announces 
that "These ruins are inhabited." 
In many ways the English inhabit 
their ruins with grace, making the 
most of the past, cherishing its bless-
ings, attempting the difficult busi-
ness of getting on with less. If the 
time comes when America needs to 
live in its ruins, we could do worse 
than learn from them. But for the 
present, it seems we would do bet-
ter to find new ways of responding 
to the world than to try to work 
out of our past. It is an article of 
faith that we must learn from his-
tory, but no one, not even the his-
torians, can tell us what we ought 
to learn, except perhaps that read-
iness to meet change is all impor-
tant in the lives of nations. The 
American sign reads "Coming Soon 
" •• •• 
Give The Cresset As A Thoughtful Gift 
•• The Cresset 
•• 
Valparaiso University 
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383 
Please send one year (nine issues) of The Cresset at $7.50 per year 
to the address below. My check is enclosed. 
Please announce the subscription as a gift from: 
Name __________________________________________________ __ 
Street __________________________________________________ __ 




It was a trip well worth taking. 
We had moved from the commu-
nity permanently four years previ-
ously, and this was our first visit 
back. Two of us had lived there as 
foreigners for seventeen years-
most of our adulthood; three were 
born there and had spent most of 
their childhood in that place. 
Crossing the border brought a 
sense of deja vu: it had happened 
so many times before. Yet there 
was one extraordinary difference. 
Often in the past I had traveled 
through tunnel or over bridge with 
misty eyes and lumpy throat, not 
wanting the stay in the U.S. to end, 
wondering when I might be return-
ing "home" again. This time, 
though, I genuinely looked for-
ward to visiting friends, seeing the 
sights from a tourist's vantage 
point, and noting changes that had 
occurred in our absence. 
In my teenage years I had been 
intrigued by the idea of living in 
another country, and as a recent 
college graduate I had been 
privileged to spend several months 
in Europe, where the thought of 
moving abroad had intensified. Yet 
the actual experience had proven 
to be a decidedly mixed blessing: a 
few years of feeling adventurous, 
followed by a decade and a half of 
yearning to return to my birthland. 
Americans as diverse as the Black 
writer James Baldwin and the 
Jewish intellectual Norman 
Podhoretz have mentioned in their 
autobiographies the fact that living 
overseas made them conscious of 
their American-ness, and that hap-
pened to me, too. Identity consists 
of our likenesses to some persons 
and groups and our differences 
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from others; living among those 
with traditions, attitudes, and goals 
divergent from our own tends to 
heighten our awareness of the char-
acteristics and opinions developed 
within our original social group. 
I had been raised in a family and 
in an environment in which pat-
riotism and the values of U.S. 
citizenship were thought of as posi-
tive, but were not especially em-
phasized. I had already voted once 
and was fairly well informed about 
politics and public issues; yet I 
hardly considered myself to be par-
ticularly civic-minded. The fact that 
my tastes and interests and views of 
history and culture had been 
shaped by my nationality had never 
entered my mind. 
Moving to an anti-American soci-
ety during the Vietnam war 
brought things to a head in a 
hurry. People automatically as-
sumed that my husband was a draft 
dodger and that we had come 
North to escape the war-mongering 
policies of our government. That 
attitude was a bit of a shock to me: 
in the circles in which I had moved 
previously the war was not terribly 
popular, but the question had at 
least been open to debate. In that 
new place, though, there was no 
other side of the story to con-
template or discuss . 
That turned out to be the pat-
tern quite often over the years. It 
wasn't so much that I supported 
the decisions and actions of the 
U.S. unequivocally, but it did not 
seem just that my government was 
always, always pictured as being 
wrong, if not evil and immoral. 
Common, everyday practices were 
criticized in the same way-it 
seemed that all things American 
were considered by many to be un-
principled, crude, stupid, motivated 
by materialism, or worse. And they 
said so. At great length and at 
every opportunity. 
I came to understand that some 
of this negativism was to be ex-
pected: the powerful are not likely 
to be loved and admired by the de-
pendent. But it does get tiresome 
when every newspaper one picks 
up, every broadcast one tunes in, 
and any number of casual conver-
sations seem to follow the same line 
of unreasonable reasoning. 
Having read The Ugly American, I 
tried hard to tolerate the situation 
without fighting back, but that is 
not my nature. Internally I became 
increasingly depressed and resent-
ful. I made some dear friends and 
had some wonderful experiences, 
but as short-term residence 
stretched into long a sense of de-
spair shadowed the good times and 
threatened to impair positive re-
lationships. In particular I did not 
want my children to grow up there, 
learning to hate much of what was 
a part of me. 
Now we have been gone long 
enough to add some balance to the 
perspective. I am more able to 
forget the frustrations of those 
years and forgive the misguided 
fervor and fanaticism that led to 
some of the excesses I found so ap-
palling. And I can say honestly that 
I appreciate the opportunities I 
had there to observe and try to un-
derstand human behavior; that has 
been important in my professional 
and academic life ever since. 
In addition, I learned some les-
sons about myself. I am not, as I 
once thought, adaptable to all cir-
cumstances. I could not be one of 
those citizens of the world that are 
sometimes written about in univer-
salistic utopias. It turns out I don't 
even automatically like everyone. 
It was fun to return, to greet 
some of those who had been im-
portant to me during a trying 
period of my life, and to touch 
base with some of the influences on 
what and who I have become. But 
I never once for a moment thought 
that perhaps I may have made a 
mistake and wished that I had 
stayed. And I never will. •• •• 
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For Good Reading 
In a Glad New Year 
In Time-
For Christmas 
The herald angels' song is an ever-
lasting antiphony ... It moves down 
the centuries above, beneath, and in 
the earth from Christmas to Christ-
mas to Christmas ... In it alone is 
hope before death and after death ... 
Their song lives to the 2,000th Christ-
mas, to the 3,000th, and at length to 
the last Christmas the world will 
see ... And on that final Christmas, 
as on the first, the angels will know, 
as we must know now, that the heart 
which began to beat in Bethlehem 
still beats in the world and for the 
world . . . And for us ... 
0. P. Kretzmann 
The Pilgrim 
Many years will pass before you un-
derstand Christmas . .. In fact, you 
will never understand it completely 
. .. But you can always believe in it, 
always . . . The Child has come to 
keep us company ... To tell us that 
heaven is nearer than we had dared 
to think ... To put the hope of 
eternity in our eyes ... To tell us 
that the manger is never empty for 
those who return to it ... And you 
will find with Him, I know, a hap-
piness which you will never find 
alone . .. 
A Free Gift Book for New Subscribers 
0. P. Kretzmann 
Christmas Garlands 
Mail to: 
0. P. Kretzmann, President of Val-
paraiso University from 1940 to 
1968, was also Editor of The Cresset 
from 1937 to 1968. In these two 
rare books many of his beloved 
"The Pilgrim" meditations were re-
printed and are now available to 
new Cresset subscr ibers as a gift to 
themselves--or" to give as a 
thoughtful Christmas gift to 
friends. This offer expires December 
16, 1985. Current subscribers who 
wish to purchase either book may 
do so by sending $4.25 to cover 
shipping and the cost of the book. 
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